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Abstract
Sectarianism has shaped Lebanese culture since the establishment of the National
Pact in 1943, and continues to be a pervasive roadblock to Lebanon’s path to
development. This thesis explores the role of religion, politics, and Lebanon’s illegitimate
government institutions in accentuating identity-based divisions, and fostering an
environment for sectarianism to emerge. In order to do this, I begin by providing an
analysis of Lebanon’s history and the rise and fall of major religious confessions as a
means to explore the relationship between power-sharing arrangements and sectarianism,
and to portray that sectarian identities are subject to change based on shifting power
dynamics and political reforms. Next, I present different contexts in which sectarianism
has amplified the country’s underdevelopment and fostered an environment for political
instability, foreign and domestic intervention, lack of government accountability, and
clientelism, among other factors, to occur. A case study into Iraq is then utilized to
showcase the implications of implementing a Lebanese-style power-sharing arrangement
elsewhere, and further evaluate its impact in constructing sectarian identities. Finally, I
conclude that it is possible to eliminate sectarianism in Lebanon and move towards a
secular state. While there are still many challenges to face in overcoming a longestablished system of governance, I highlight the anti-sectarian partisan movements that
are advocating for change, and their optimistic path to success.
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1
Introduction
“Are you Sunni or Shia? My father told me that Sunnis are good people, and that
Shias are bad. You’re Sunni, right? I couldn’t be friends with a bad person.” Nour
appeared distraught as she waited for my answer, praying that my response wouldn’t lead
to the termination of our friendship. I said I didn’t know, because I didn’t. Up until that
point, I was a fourth-grader who hadn’t really given my religious sect any thought.
Initially, I was taken aback - insulted that Nour knew something I didn’t, wondering why
my parents failed to mention such a seemingly critical thing before. When I got home, I
informed my father what I had learnt from Nour at school that day, and asked him the
same question: Am I Sunni or Shia? To my surprise, I witnessed my father’s gentile
expression evolve into one dominated by frustration and sadness.
My father said that Nour was wrong. He said that it shouldn’t matter what my
religious sect is because at the end of the day to be a Muslim was to be a Muslim. He said
that religion is not, and should not be indicative of one’s goodness. He said that I didn’t
need to know the answer to the question - and when I asked why, he said: “because it
shouldn’t be a question at all.”
Fast-forward 12 years. Today, the Sunni-Shia divide has escalated to new
extremes, and intergroup violence along sectarian lines is no longer a rarity but a daily
occurrence in the Middle East. Religious identities have become more salient now than
ever before, and are constantly abused by political actors for political gain. While
sectarianism portrays realistic religious distinctions, it has always been associated with
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the fight for power, resources, and territory, which is especially the case in Lebanon. As
a Lebanese citizen, I’ve witnessed how one’s religious affiliation, such as to be “Sunni”
or “Shia” is no longer solely representative of one’s religious views, but directly
associated with one’s political alliance, societal relations, and communal allegiances.
With a growing Shia community, dwindling Christian influence, armed political group
acting as a state within a state, and a divided Sunni population, tensions in Lebanon are
high as interreligious insecurity persists. In Lebanese society, religious identities are
representative of basic realities, such as access to education, services, and limited
resources. With the presence of such polarized identities in Lebanon, the prevalence of a
national identity is diminishing, overridden by one’s loyalty to their own sect or
community. As American University of Beirut Professor Rima Majed states, in the
current Lebanese context “religious sectarian and political identities are used
interchangeably.”1
Further, religion is a significant factor in the country’s underdevelopment and has
become substantial to one’s ethnic identity. What appears to be a war between the Sunni
and Shia Muslims is seldom ever fought on the basis of religious ideologies. Conflict
itself is not ‘religious,’ but rather the crystallization of religion into tribal identities with
biases towards out-groups is a common cause for problem, especially in Third World
nations. The deep ethnic antagonisms between Lebanon’s different sects have played a
significant role in obstructing the country’s development and restricting economic
advancements. As the cultural antipathies deepen within the community, the
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underdevelopment worsens, and as it worsens, the cultural antipathies grow even deeper.
This cyclical situation in Lebanon has become so difficult to break that it leaves me
wondering what came first – the chicken or the egg.
In attempt to understand the prominence of political sectarianism in Lebanon, and
the relationship between religion and politics, this body of work hopes to provide an
overarching analysis of the situation. This thesis delves into the role of political
governmental institutions in fostering an environment for sectarianism to emerge,
explores the impact of sectarianism on Lebanon’s underdevelopment, and offers plausible
recommendations for overcoming sectarianism in Lebanon. Throughout the course of my
thesis, I aim to convey the following points:
First, Lebanon’s illegitimate governmental and political institutions accentuate
segmental cleavages, such as religion/identity-based divisions, rather than alleviating
them, allowing for the politicization of religious identities, also known as sectarian
identities. Tribes in Lebanon are divided on the basis of religious orientation, and as each
religious sect receives different benefits based on power and representation delegated to
that group through the government, tribal identities became synonymous with religious
identity. Second, sectarian identities are associated with the relative strength of certain
ethnic groups, and thus are subject to change with modified power dynamics and political
reforms. This is evident through the historical shifts in power among the major religious
confessions in Lebanon, based on their relative power at specific times. Third, the
sectarian conflict in Lebanon has amplified the country’s underdevelopment due to the
constant political gridlock and instability, lack of government accountability, a clientelist
system, foreign and domestic intervention, and a neighboring civil war, among many
3

other factors. Finally, it is possible to eliminate sectarianism and move towards a secular
state. This notion is plausible as sectarian identities are not perpetual, but rather fluctuate
based on the power dynamics. With modifications to the power dynamics and political
reform, a Lebanese state in which the national identity triumphs over religious identity
can exist - but it won’t be easy.

The Salience of Religion in Multiethnic Societies, A Scholarly View
Culture consists of the beliefs, behaviors, customs, language, and general way of
life of a particular group of people at a particular time. It is through culture that groups,
and people within those groups, define themselves and contribute to society as it affects
how people think and act. Several theorists believe that cultural elements, such as religion
and ethnic unity, are crucial to a nation’s development and stability. Author Howard
Handelman defines ethnic identity as a “way in which certain groups have come to view
themselves as distinct over time,” based on shared beliefs, shared experiences, and other
cultural traits that distinguish it from other proximate ethnicities.2 There are different
kinds of ethnic-cultural divisions, such as nationality, tribe, race, and religion.
Religion is a crucial aspect of culture as it is a pervasive force in the third world,
inhibiting development in some countries while encouraging it in others. While many
modernist theorists view religion to be an impediment to political and economic growth,
in many third world countries the move towards secularization has, more often than not,
caused religious backlash and political instability.3 Countries that are ethnically
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pluralistic in the above divisions tend to face conflict due to ethnic antagonisms,
impeding social, political, and economic development.4
When analyzing international politics religion is a factor often disregarded and
has become increasingly important in the third world as a critical source of identification
for a significant number of people. While religion serves as a source of comfort through
the unification of a community of believers, it simultaneously emphasizes ingroup and
outgroup religious differences.5 As a result, religion often tends to energize conflict and
social divisions in developing countries.6
The Social Identity Theory, initially proposed by Psychologists Tajfel and Turner
in 1979, best provides insight on how membership to a social group can affect one’s selfconcept.7 A social group is defined loosely as a group of individuals who identify
themselves as affiliates of the same social category.8 Individuals may choose to identify
with a group for multiple distinct reasons, such as shared values, beliefs, or concerns (ex.
Religion, culture, political ideologies, ethnicity, nationality, culture, etc.).9 One’s selfconcept is essentially a distinct mix of many identities (religion, ethnicity, gender, class,
etc.) along with their relative significance depending on time and situation. For instance,
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in some societies gender and class may be most important, while in others political
ideologies and religion may be of higher significance.10
Through this self-categorization of one’s self and others that may be similar, an
individual subconsciously creates a fundamental linkage between their group
membership and their own sense of self.11 Whether it be race, religion, or language,
people reside in certain groups that are bound to alter their personal views and responses
to several situations. Groups may provide a sense of belonging and support, or largely,
individuals may rely on their group to help them attain certain goals that they would not
be able to accomplish on their own, such as social change through political
involvement.12
Religious identification with a group may be deeper than other group
memberships for a variety of reasons. This may be explained by the dual function of
religiosity as not only a social identity, but also a system of beliefs shared between
groups. Religiosity, unlike other elements, involves a system of beliefs that include a
shared faith in a higher power and a way in which to give one’s life events meaning. As
religion may be critical to one’s personal identity, establishing a group membership
around religious similarities tends to increase the significance of group membership to
one’s self-concept.13 Additionally, the belief that one’s religion is the ‘truth’ may
encourage a growing religious identity and deeper bonds with other group members. If
one religious group is strongly tied to their sacred worldview, they might feel antagonism
10
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towards those that don’t, creating an ingroup and outgroup bias. In many real-life cases,
this antagonism has resulted in intergroup conflicts, as groups are tied to their belief that
their religion is the only correct one.
While religious identification can be crucial, and beneficial to one’s well-being, it
is also the ground for multiple intractable intergroup conflicts. Religious conviction can
cause intolerance between groups, fragmentation of society, and “over-zealous
proselytization.”14 Religious exclusivity can also be extremely detrimental to pluralistic
countries, or those attempting to host a liberal democracy.15
Threats to Religious Identity & the Rise of Conflict
It is often under distressing circumstances or threats to one’s safety and security
that membership in a group may become more salient.16 An individual's identity can be
threatened through ill-treatment, discrimination and, or, political violence, among many
other things. The resulting stress fundamentally motivates individuals to identify
themselves with supportive communities that may enhance their well-being. If the threats
from one group continue to invalidate another group’s identity, it may become very
difficult to ignore, resulting in conflict.17 Identity clashes most usually involve polarized
groups with distinct identities that believe that the fight is between ‘us’ and them.’18 The
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victimized in group then shares a narrative of collective identity that they use to justify
their responses.19
This is especially this case if one’s religious identity is threatened. Although
intergroup conflict occurs for many reasons other than religious strife, threats to religious
identity could result in unparalleled extremely critical repercussions, as a danger to one’s
beliefs is a danger to one’s existence.20 Religion is often the “defining marker of a
cohesive and compelling collective identity.”21 Similarly, an individual cannot change
their ethnicity; thus group membership based on any aspect of ethnicity is virtually
impermeable.22 Once born a Christian, always a Christian. Hence, the outbreak of ethnic
conflict within a context of unchanging ethnicity can result in extreme actions intended to
eradicate the outgroup. These conflicts, known as identity clashes, have been visible
throughout international relations as groups turn to genocide, civil wars, or other
unfortunate forms of retaliation. In many instances, these political or ethnic conflicts are
a consequence of religious group differences.
Religion can even be a motivator for groups to respond aggressively and exert
violence, as a threat to one’s faith holds more immense symbolic value. Thus instead of
just triggering one’s personal identity and set of beliefs, an individual or group of people
may feel that they must retaliate for holy objectives.23 This logic can be applied to
explain the motivation behind religious fundamentalist movements. Fundamentalisms,
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while inherently different based on context, all share the belief that their group is under
threat, and thus endorse a set of strategies that will help retain their discrete group
identity.24 This ‘defense of religion’ can manifest itself through political or social attacks
with consequences. When national identity is under threat, individuals are likely to
prioritize their dual, religious identity, and view that to be more representative of
themselves.25
As previously stated, religion itself is not necessarily a source of conflict, but
similar to race or ethnicity, religion is a way in which people differentiate themselves and
their group from others. This evolution of religion into a tribal, sectarian identity forms in
group/outgroup biases which may result in large conflict.26 In almost every situation, the
inferior group with meager amounts of power, whether it be political or economic, is
more conscious of their marginalization, heightening tensions between them and their
superiors.
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2
The Shifting Sands of Sectarianism in Lebanon:
A Historical Timeline
The divisions in Lebanon nowadays are 0% religious and 100% political. In
Islam we have the five pillars of Islam, whether you are Sunni or Shia, we both
follow these five pillars. So logically speaking, the divisions are not religious at
all. Maybe there’s a slight difference in the way we pray or place our hands, but
at the end of the day, we’re all Muslim. Some people argue over little things like
who was to follow the Prophet Muhammad, but even then, regarding the
prophet’s predecessor, it was about politics and power and who’s going to take
over.
- Maya, American University of Beirut (AUB) Graduate

Taifiyya (Arabic) or sectarianism refers to this ancestral inclination among
Lebanon’s diverse religious communities to prioritize their family and communal
religious identity over that of their nation-state, inevitably undermining Wataniyya or
patriotism.27 Sectarianization is the purposeful exploitation of religious identities for
political gain. In modern-day Lebanon, sectarianism and the nation-state are one and the
same, the two cannot be isolated due to the governing politics that legitimate certain
paths of elitist progress. In a country of 4.5 million citizens of 18 different faiths, religion
in Lebanon is viewed as one’s most defining attribute - engraved on identification cards
and representative of loyalties and political views.28 In this confessional multi-religious
state that was established as liberal and democratic, but not secular, the crystallization of
religion into a tribal identity is imminent while a national identity is lacking a collective
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struggle.29 There have been several disputations over political influence throughout
Lebanese history as a result of the disproportionate distribution of power and
representation among the religious communities. Political institutions play a substantial
role in the creation and development of sectarian identities and forms of political
mobilization in Lebanon.
This history chapter aims to dissect the key events that portray the shifts in
political power from Christians versus Muslims to Sunni versus Shia, and what led the
sectarian sands to change. While Maronite Christians first rose to power due to their
institutionalized superiority following the National Pact, the balance of power shifted
afterward. First in favor of the Sunni Muslims after the 1975 Civil War and 1989 Taif
Agreement, followed by the more recent re-emergence of Shia political power and
influence. The nature of these subsequent shifts in the balance of power allows for the
prediction that while many Lebanese view their sectarian identities as rigid and
ineradicable, sectarianism in fact is a modern construct produced by political identity –
thus, indicating that these antagonisms are not impenetrable but sometimes subject to
change.
The events that propagated a shift in power trace back to the establishment of an
independent Lebanon and the institutionalization of sectarianism in Lebanon’s
consociational power-sharing arrangements. This chapter hopes to target how “Lebanon’s
peculiar corporate power-sharing model hardens sectarian identities, invites systematic

29
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deadlock, precludes the emergence of cross-sectarian modes of political mobilization,
and, ultimately, leads to cyclical domestic crises that invite external interventions.”30
Things have drastically changed in Lebanon… Yesterday’s enemies became
today’s allies and vice versa… The Sunni-Shia split is one of those things you
really feel have changed… especially after the assassination of Rafic Hariri…
This discourse really didn’t exist before… For all we knew, we were Muslims and
we were fighting against the Christians’ political project in the country… Today
some Christians are our allies and it is the Sunni’s political project that we are
fighting.31
- Hassan, a Shia fighter with the Amal party

The Establishment of the Lebanese State
The Lebanese Republic, a once prosperous small country in the Middle East, is
recognized for its rich religious and ethnic diversity that evidently shaped its history and
cultural identity. The unique multi-confessional climate in Lebanon with 18 officially
recognized religions has served as a basis for much of Lebanon’s conflicts for centuries
past and in the modern day.32 Lebanon’s cultural and political identity has been strongly
influenced by its preceding colonization from the Ottoman Empire and French Mandate,
which held control over the country for a substantial amount of time.
The Ottoman Empire’s religious authoritarian rule began in the late 19th century.
Due to the diverse religious landscape in Lebanon at the time, several communities
opposed the Ottoman’s religious rule and shared a universal principle that equality of all
political voices was necessary and of the highest importance.33 Even then, openness to
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religious multiplicity in a multiethnic society was crucial to the Lebanese identity. In
1914, the Christian community, 60% of which were of Maronite descent, held the most
extensive accumulation of wealth in Mount Lebanon and comprised 80% of the
population.34 The Muslim and Druze communities made up the remainder of the
population.35 The accumulation of wealth was not sufficient to justify the Christians’
claim of political supremacy, yet the political opportunity of ruling an independent
Lebanon meant to promote the quality of religious faiths, and Arabism was necessary for
Christians to claim their superiority. The affluent Christians who were also the highest
educated led the movement towards independence from Ottomans, and viewed
themselves as adept to establishing a universal state via “the enlightenment and openness
that they have gained by bridging the Western and Eastern worlds.”36 At the time of
Mount Liban’s formation, the Sunnis constituted the largest Muslim community and
largely rejected the concept of a Christian-dominant Lebanon, preferring the creation of
‘pan-Arab nation,’ in specific, a Greater Syria.37
This vision was put aside following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after
World War I, which was followed by Maronite supremacy accompanied by French
authority. In 1920, under French Mandate influence, Grand Liban (Greater Lebanon) was
created on 1 September 1920. The French largely expanded Lebanon to include territories
that were initially parts of Syria, such as Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Tyre, southern
Lebanon, and the eastern Bekaa valley.38 A substantial Muslim population accompanied
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this territorial expansion, increasing the proportion of the Muslim community already
present and diminishing the demographic superiority once held by the Maronites in
Mount Lebanon.39 The expansion of Greater Lebanon also annexed Muslim-dominant
rural areas which were economically underdeveloped in comparison to the coastal and
mountain regions.40 The combination of several distinct landscapes meant that Grand
Liban now contained municipalities of different religious, economic, and cultural
backgrounds – the majority of which were highly underdeveloped. These religious and
economic ‘cleavages’ were described by Albert Hourani as “a condition where different
segments of population subscribed to ‘different ideas of what Lebanon is and should be.’
with each adhering to its own definition and ‘vision of Lebanon.’”41
The clash of identities and backgrounds created two concepts of the ‘national
identity’ - Lebanism and Arabism - producing a debate surrounding what the collective
cultural identity should be. ‘Lebanism,’ an extreme form of Phoenicianism, was primarily
held by the Maronites who stressed a modern, culturally-accepting and diverse
Mediterranean identity of Lebanon. The Lebanese Christians who followed this vision
shared the language of French, while “Arabic was an alien language that was imposed
coercively.”42 Oppositely, the supporters of ‘Arabism’ largely consisted of Sunni
Muslims that were skeptical towards the Maronite’s vision for Lebanon, for they believed
that since Lebanon had once been part of a Greater Syria, it should uphold this Arab
identity and history.43 This first sectarian dynamic that was present in the founding of
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Lebanon set the stage for power battles and conflict between the different religious sects
and created a clear divide between the Maronite Christians and Muslims, in particular.
Furthermore, the European powers favored the Christian communities of the
Ottoman Empire and identified them as the superior sect, one that required special
protection from the Muslim communities, better education from the missionaries, and
favored by the European merchants for employment.44 The Europeans justified their
intervention in the Middle East through the affirmation that there were intrinsic
distinctions between Christianity and Islam, and that the Christian majority was to be the
destined rulers of Lebanon. 45 The Christians had indulged in their French character and
were placed on a pedestal by the French for so long that it only seemed natural to exert
their superiority and serve as the leaders of an independent Lebanon, even though for
centuries prior, Lebanon had existed as a sanctuary for oppressed minorities.
Fundamentally, Lebanon’s interaction with European colonization transformed the
connotation of religion in a “multi-confessional society because it emphasized sectarian
identity as the only viable marker of political reform and the only authentic basis for
political claims.” (16) This was evident through the Ottoman rule and following French
Mandate in which religious identities were deployed for political and social causes.
In other words, the colonizers viewed the Maronite Christian communities as
being more capable of running Grand Liban, even though this was a largely unjustifiable
claim. The Sunni Muslim extremely disliked this bias and overwhelming preference for
the Maronite vision of Greater Lebanon under the French Mandate. This led the Sunni
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communities to seek retaliation by heavily boycotting the released drafts of the Lebanese
constitution in 1922 and 1925 for they feared the lack of presence of Muslim identity.46
At the time, even then among the Muslims, the Shia narrative was widely neglected in the
making of an “independent Lebanon,” crystallizing the abandonment of the Shia identity
in early independence.47 The repercussions of neglecting the Shia majority will be
evident, and to be further discussed in following sections. Nonetheless, while the main
sects were attempting to establish a collective identity, many minorities were left
marginalized and largely unwelcomed.
The Lebanese Republic was created in 1926, and essentially handed the Maronite
elites the most extensive share of power, which was further supplemented by the National
Pact in 1943.48 When Lebanon established its independence from the French on
November 22nd 1943, the National Pact of 1943 that followed laid the foundations for
the Lebanese confessional political system, based on the 1932 population census.49 In
Political Science terminology, confessionalism is a “system of government that
proportionally allocated political power among a country’s communities - whether
religious or ethnic- according to their percentage of the population.50 This consociational
system distributes political positions between communities based on their numerical
representation.
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The 1932 population census inevitably crippled the government and strengthened
the system of patronage because it based the power-sharing political system on the
sectarian balance, in which Maronites made up approximately 34% of the population,
Sunnis 19%, and Shias 16%, with several other sects filling the remainder.51 Under the
National Pact, the new nation-state and its institutions were divided based on a religious
sect’s prominence. The Maronite elites were given the Presidency, the Sunnis the prime
ministership, and the Shia the speaker of parliament.52 Thus, since then, “the relationship
between sectarianism and class relations in both pre-war and postwar Lebanon is thus
reciprocal rather than linear.”53

After Independence, Before War
The National Pact of 1943 (al-Mithaq al-Watani) attempted to diffuse political
power inequalities by establishing a ‘productive’ power-sharing political arrangement
that gave all religious communities shared state ownership.54 In pursuit of diminished
sub-national sectarian identities, the Pact characterized Lebanon as an independent state
with a visage Arab (Arab face), which was inevitably interpreted differently by the
Muslims and the Christians. The Christians believed this to mean that Lebanon was
located in the midst of the Arab world, but was not actually an Arab state. To the
Muslims, this statement of an ‘Arab face’ indicated that Arabism was a crucial feature of
the Lebanese state.55 Contrary to its intentions, The National Pact resulted in the
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institutionalization of a “hierarchically organized sectarian democracy, whereby political
equality was expected within, but not among, confessions.”56 As a result of the National
Pact’s distributions, the Maronite Christians being the most abundant religious
community, making up 34% of the Lebanese population at the time, received
disproportionately enormous political powers. These powers included the Presidency, the
right to appoint the prime minister, and the right to veto or refuse to enact legislation.57
The distribution of the highest public office positions to the proportional
distribution of dominant sects (Maronite Christians at the time), resulted in the failure of
state officials to involve themselves in the improvement of predominantly Shia areas in
southern Lebanon, and northern regions.58 Instead, state-affiliated elites focused on the
improvement of their own regions through the distribution of jobs, pavement of roads,
and presence of sustainable electricity. The unequal distribution of representation based
on sect size almost immediately places the less prominent religious sects at a
disadvantage. Any given Lebanese could not obtain benefits on the basis of their
citizenship rights because “jobs, housing, telephones, and education were guaranteed not
by the state, but through appeals to deputies and ministers and presidents who were
themselves appointed or elected according to sectarian laws.” 59 Electoral and personal
status laws were regulated by religious affiliation such that to be Lebanese meant to be
defined according to religious affiliation. There could be no Lebanese citizen who was
not at the same time a member of a particular religious community.”60 This left many
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Islamic ethnic groups with weak representation to feel as though their relative power was
not being translated accordingly, as they struggled to obtain their righteous benefits from
the government. 61 Religious identity has manifested itself as an individual’s most distinct
attribute that can’t be neglected as it’s even stamped on identification and voter
registration cards, meaning that religion is inextricably interlaced with one’s Lebanese
identity.62
Thus, sectarianism in this context weakens the national identity and establishes
disruptive religious loyalties as each government elite channeled their power to improve
the living standards of their community, which all ties back to the 1943 National Pact that
systemized independent Lebanon. It is quite ironic that although Lebanon was built on a
confessional system meant to stabilize it and promote inter-sectarian representation,
involvement, and collaboration, it instead institutionalized religious sects as being an
official component of the state structure. This system also weakened the power of the
central state in promoting a stable nation as this system is consensus-based.
Consequently, the Pact had direct ramifications on Lebanon’s foreign policy and
international relations. It suggested that due to the French tutelage, Lebanon should
maintain stable ties with Western countries, but should also back Arab causes due to the
country’s demographic modification and location.63 In Lebanon’s case, the political
institutions play a substantial role in the construction and hardening of sectarian
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identities, prevention of cross-sectarian forms of political mobilization, and
fundamentally leads to domestic crises that solicit external interventions.64
The creation of a political model that had a Christian identity initiated the
crystallization of religion into a tribal, sectarian identity in Lebanon. While sectarianism
displays religious differences, it has consistently been linked to power, resources, and
territory. Since every Lebanese citizen was a member of a particular religious community
and could not change their religion of descent, this placed certain communities at odds
with those that were favoring better and established disruptive religious loyalties.65
People lost hope in statehood and the political system and felt that their loyalty should be
focused on their family and sect, rather than to the state, which eventually led to the
outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975.66

The Outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War (1975 -1990)
The 1948 Palestine/Israel war resulted in an influx of Sunni-Muslim Palestinian
refugees to Lebanon. The Palestinian issue, largely the presence of approximately a
million refugees and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), was causing turmoil
and divisions within Lebanese society since the nation’s formation, especially as many
Maronites viewed the PLO as a threat to Lebanon because they feared Israeli
intervention. Additionally, the presence of the Palestinian refugees was heightening
sectarian tensions as many Christian communities were opposed to providing these
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refugees with Lebanese citizenships, chiefly due to the fact that their Sunni Muslim
background would tip the demographics in favor of the Muslims. In 1969, several leftist
Muslim political organizations in Lebanon were combined into a coalition known as the
Lebanese National Movement by Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt.67 The Lebanese National
Movement (LNA) chose to support the Palestinian cause in Lebanon and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization.68
This chapter aims to portray how the effects of the war, and the foreign
intervention it yielded, heightened the sectarian tensions in Lebanon between the
Maronite Christian and Muslim communities. The following sections will highlight how
the end of the war, which was largely characterized by the redistribution of power
between the sects, lead to a shift in sectarian tensions from Christians versus Muslims to
Sunni Muslims versus Shia Muslims.
As Palestinian activity heightened in Lebanon, the Maronites readiness to tolerate
an ‘Arab-centered view of Lebanon’ substantially declined.69 In response to the growing
presence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Christians started setting up
armed militias and readying government forces as they were concerned that the PLO
would attempt a seize of Lebanon.70 On the other hand, Lebanese Sunni groups began
establishing armed militias as well, to compete against those of the Christians. The
tension between Lebanese supporting the Palestinian cause versus the Maronite militias
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and government forces led to the outbreak of Civil War after a PLO-associated Muslim
attempted to assassinate a Maronite leader.71 On May 31st 1975, a Maronite militia
attacked a civilian bus in response to the attempted Maronite murder.72 Thus, Lebanon
experienced its first eruption of sectarian violence between the Christian and Muslim
communities which translated into a civil war that lasted 15 years.
This period of turmoil solicited foreign intervention, principally the involvement
of Syria after it intervened in 1976 to prevent PLO domination of Lebanon. The Lebanese
President at the time, Suleiman Frangieh, welcomed the Syrian troops into Lebanon to
serve as deterrence in the fight between Lebanese and Palestinian factions – little did he
know that Syria would not only play a vital role in the Civil War, but also maintain an
extended presence in the years to follow.73 Syria cheerfully strengthened its oversight
over Lebanese domestic politics during the war and maintained its troublesome presence
long afterward furthering the sectarian strife between Lebanese that supported the Syrian
presence and those that strongly opposed it.74 Other external forces, such as Iran and
Israel, got involved in Lebanon during this time as well, each engaging in a proxy war
over Lebanese territory. For instance, the emergence of the Iran-backed Shia militant
group Hezbollah was largely prompted by the presence of Israel in the south of Lebanon,
and relied on the transportation of weapons and cash from Iran through Syria.75 These
sectarian militias such as Hezbollah necessitated foreign financial support, deepening
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Syria and Iran’s ties to Lebanese politics. As Author and Lebanese Professor Bassel
Salloukh states,
The outbreak of the civil war underscored the failure of the National Pact to
manage the inherent contradictions of Lebanon’s confessional politics, ones that
were exacerbated by overlapping domestic and external contests. During the
following 15 years of civil war, the Lebanese state lost its monopoly over the use
of legitimate violence Sectarian sub-communities stood supreme, each with its
own militia, symbols, and administrative apparatus.76
As a result of the war, sectarianism became a visible aspect of one’s everyday life
in Lebanon. Sectarian militant groups took control over customs, duties, ports, indirect
taxes, and forms of communication such as television channels, radio stations, and
newspapers. “Militia power not only practiced ethnic, sectarian and political ‘cleansing’
of territories,’ it also eradicated all memories of coexistence and shared interests between
the Lebanese.”77 The Lebanese demographic realities were entirely reconstructed due to
the sectarian cleansing, causing hundreds of thousands of Lebanese to lose their homes
and families. Many Sunnis regarded the Christians as collaborators with the Western
powers and Israel and lost their image of being fellow Lebanese, while the Shia felt
extremely marginalized because of the 1982 Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon.78
“Sectarianism was much a repudiation of the social hierarchy as it was a collapse of the
Lebanese state that had been created under the National Pact.”79
The Civil War amplified the tensions between sects as it was a clear display of
religious-based atrocity and discrimination. Unarmed civilians were executed simply on
the basis of their religion. The instability that followed invigorated corruption and one’s
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identity became strongly associated with religious loyalty. Lebanon witnessed many
changes, including the “political-social advancement of the Shia ethnic group,” following
the evolution of Hezbollah.80
Israeli Invasion of Lebanon in 1982 & Re-emergence of Shiism
In 1982, in the midst of Lebanon’s fifteen-year-long civil war, Israel invaded
Lebanon in attempt to eradicate the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and insert
an amiable government in Beirut that would be willing to make peace with Israel.81 At
the time, the Shia community was located in Southern Lebanon, the northern Bekaa
valley, and Beirut’s suburbs in the south.82 While some Shiites first supported the Israeli
force’s mission to remove Palestinian militants from the area, over time popular opinion
against Israel “began to turn as the occupation continued and outside influences, such as
the Iranian Revolution, inspired Shiites in Lebanon to mobilize.”83
Largely abandoned at the time of Lebanon’s establishment, the Shiite community
was repeatedly politically and economically marginalized. In 1974, Imam Musa al-Sadr,
notable Iranian cleric of Lebanese descent, began mobilizing the Shiite community
through his Movement of the Dispossessed.84 As a supporter of peace, Sadr promoted
unity within the government and the creation of a political forum to openly discuss the
concerns of the Shia community to the state.85 Musa al-Sadr dedicated two decades to
“raising the political and religious consciousness and the quality of life of Lebanon’s long
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underprivileged Shia community.” 86 This led to the formation of the nonviolent Shiite
group Amal, literally meaning “Hope,” in 1975 with “both political and military elements
whose members are motivated by the presence of local Palestinian militias and antiIsraeli sentiments.”87 Amal, led by Husain al-Musawi, initially received support from the
Shia community for their peaceful approach that avoided Islamic rhetoric.88 However,
after Israeli forces caused harm to the Shiite civilians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee
camps, and at a Shiite festival known as Ashura, several Shiites were prompted to join a
militant resistance group, later known as Hezbollah (the “Party of God”).89
After the disappearance of Imam al-Sadr in Libya in 1978, Iran experienced an
Iranian Revolution of 1979, which accompanied substantial changes to the political
structure of the Iranian state.90 The revolution shifted the power from the pro-Israeli Shah
to anti-Zionist Ayatollah Khomeini, who was keen to administer support and military
assistance to his Lebanese Shia followers. Simultaneously, the Shia activists were
exhausted by the lack of recognition and aid from their state, and the ineffectiveness of
the peaceful Amal movement, thus inspiring them to establish a militant strategy intended
battle foreign forces and protect the Shiite community that was profoundly affected by
the Israeli invasion.91
With support from Iran’s Khomeini, several individuals once part of the Amal
movement split away from the group to join the establishment of the militant group
Hezbollah. Unlike other secular political organizations such as Amal, Hezbollah
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welcomed Iran’s Islamic model of clerical rule.92 The Iranian Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC) became significant players in the group's formation, promoting
Hezbollah’s mission through providing funds and training. Additionally, the Syrian
government along with other foreign actors backed Hezbollah, propelling it to grow and
expand rapidly as the most significant Shiite organization in Lebanon.93
In 1985, Hezbollah officially launched its political program through the release of
a manifesto that outlined the group’s most prominent goals, including the creation of an
Islamic regime, the expulsion of Israeli and Western influences in Lebanon, and the
destruction of the Israeli state.94 The document attempted to “toe the line between Islamic
ideology and appeal to Lebanese outside the Shi’a community,” and pledged Hezbollah’s
allegiance to Iranian leader Khomeini, portraying the initial establishment of ties between
Iran-linked entities and the Shiite group, which are still prominent today more than ever
before.95
Israel continued to occupy southern Lebanon with little concern to the Shia
community there, with little to no knowledge of Hezbollah’s establishment. Yet, once the
Israeli army ventured to Beirut to lay siege, they encountered resilient resistance where
Lebanese Hezbollah Shia fighters were stationed and ready to fight.96 Hezbollah
continued to serve as a resistance force against the Israeli troops until their withdrawal in
2000, which will be discussed in detail in the following sections. Essentially, as the civil
war was coming to its end, Hezbollah exhibited itself as a dominant actor in Lebanon.
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The expansive turmoil that the civil war unleashed was deplorably inviting to
foreign influences that maintain a presence in Lebanon today. Iran’s initial involvement
in Lebanon represented its campaign to spread the notion of an Islamic revolution,
utilizing zealous ideologies to mobilize Shia fighters. The Syrian regime also found
sanctuary in supporting the Shia party as it was an unforeseen mechanism to protecting
its interests of power consolidation and establishing an alliance with Iran against both
Israel and the United States.97 This Hezbollah-led “Shi’a political ascendancy and the
subsequent claim for a larger share of political power transpired within the context of
struggle against Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon,” marking a transition towards
the emergence of Shia influence in the country.98
Taif Agreement of 1989
The Taif Accord of October 22nd, 1989, put an end to the 15-year Lebanese civil
war. In addition to settling the warring parties, the Taif agreement modified the
constitution to alter the confessional political system put in place under the National Pact,
consequently reconstructing the sectarian order and offsetting the proportion in place that
favored the Christians.99 The representation in government which was previously 6:5 in
favor of the Christians was modified with the Taif accord to be 50:50 Christian/Muslim
representation.100 There is a total of 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament that were
distributed equally amongst the Christians and Muslims (reference Table 1 for the
complete breakdown). Further, the agreement upheld all the components of the
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confessional system, but altered the organization to represent the demographic realities of
contemporary Lebanon, such as a growing Muslim population.101 The reshuffling of the
system through Taif altered the sectarian landscape that once hosted divisive tensions
between the Christians and Muslims, to tensions between Lebanon’s two central Muslim
communities: Sunni versus Shia.

Table 1. Source: “Lebanon’s Governance,” Fanack, last updated October 24, 2017.

Ultimately, the agreement substantially diminished the Maronite Christians
influence, decreasing the President’s control of the cabinet and executive power.102 As a
result, the Prime Minister (Sunni), Speaker of Parliament (Shia), and the Council of
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Ministers received larger shares of powers to equalize the power dynamics.103 The
Muslim Prime Minister was no longer appointed by the Christian president, but rather
directly elected by the assembly.104 Radically, Taif shifted the executive power away
from the Maronite president, and largely towards the Council of Ministers’ ‘collective
capacity.’105 The Council of Ministers, which is composed of all sects, gained the true
executive authority and is required to take decisions in a consociational manner, giving a
larger percentage of religious denominations a say in government matters. Certain
choices such as those regarding war, peace, and international treaties, among others,
require two-thirds approval by the ministers in the cabinet, which was intended to protect
the system from Christian or Muslim domination.
Similarly, the Taif Accord also expanded the powers of the Shia speaker of
parliament. The speaker would now serve for a four-year term, and “was subject to a very
difficult two-thirds vote of confidence, albeit only at the end of the second year.”106 The
Speaker was to also play a key role in the choosing of a Prime Minister, and election of
the President, along with substantial say Lebanon’s domestic and foreign relations.107 The
rise of Hezbollah along with the redistribution of representation embodied the political
and military rise of the Shi’a community.
The Taif Accord also required the disarmament of all Lebanese militias, yet
Hezbollah did not cede, stating that the armed militias are essential in defending the south
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of Lebanon from Israeli occupation.108 The political document also failed to provide a
timeline for the withdrawal of Syrian influence and troops in Lebanon. Michel Aoun,
Commander of the Army and interim Prime Minister at the time, rejected the Taif Accord
stating that Syria’s so-called ‘invisible hand’ in Lebanon was causing turmoil and wanted
international guarantee that its withdrawal would be enforced before approving it.109 In
response to this, on October 13th, 1990, a Syrian-led military operation dethroned Aoun
from the Presidential Palace in Lebanon, causing him to leave Lebanon and seek refuge
in France.110 This incident portrays the inability of the Taif Accord to be void of sectarian
politics and reveals the role the agreement played basically ‘granting’ Syria the position
of post-war power broker in Lebanon. Yet, the Taif Accord eventually acknowledged the
presence of relations between Lebanon and Syria and requested that Syrian troops
relocate to the Beqa region, instead of complete withdrawal.111 This decision was
representative of the privileged influence that Syria had on Lebanon, furthering its
intervention in Lebanese affairs.
Nonetheless, the postwar power-sharing agreement reconstructed the sectarian
political system to manifest the modern demographic and political realities. In doing so
however, the Taif agreement made sectarian modes of political identitfication and
mobilization salient in post-war Lebanon as each sect was given appropriate
representation.112 While the National Pact was more of a hierarchical confessional powersharing arrangement, the Taif Accord restructured the system to be more of an “inter-
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sectarian partnership.”113 This led to the phenomenon in postwar Lebanon known as
“troika” in which policy-making depended on the Maronite President, Sunni Prime
Minister, and Shia speaker of parliament, in accordance with other Lebanese sectarian
and political elite.114 Salloukh defines the troika in his book as,
“The three figures [acting] as sole representatives of all major demands raised by
their sectarian communities. Each assumed the role of negotiator in the name of
his sect in a dizzying bargaining game involving the two counterparts. [...] Thus,
the troika represented the most powerful clientelistic para-institution in postwar
Lebanon.”115
Hence, the Taif Accord is viewed by many as the “formalization of the decline in
Christian, and specifically Maronite, power within the government.”116 This agreement
re-established the power dynamic, especially in favor of Sunni-controlled Cabinet and
premiership.117

Post-War Lebanon under Pax Syriana (1990-2006)
I was against Syria’s presence in Lebanon because they were influencing
Lebanese decision making to meet their interests, not ours. When Rafic Hariri
was Prime Minister, he took a trip to meet the Syrian President Bashar Al Assad.
Yet, before he could do so, the Syrians put him through heavy security screening
and had him go through security forces before he could meet the President. Hariri
was Lebanon’s PRIME MINISTER and he had to go through an officer. That’s
humiliating! He should not have to deal with a low-positioned Syrian officer in
intelligence services – he should be welcomed directly by the Prime Minister of
Syria, out of respect. Especially at a time when Syria’s engagement in Lebanon
was widespread, and no one could do a thing about it. It’s plain disrespect.
- Salim, AUB Graduate

113

Ibid.
Ibid.
115
Ibid.
116
Diane Riskedahl, "Graphic Identity in the Scriptorial Landscape of Lebanon."
117
Mansoor Moaddel, Jean Kors, and Johan Garde. “Sectarianism and Counter-Sectarianism in Lebanon.”
114

31

Rafic Hariri, a Lebanese business tycoon and Sunni diplomat, emerged as
Lebanon’s first post-war Prime Minister. Hariri was elected in 1992, Lebanon’s first postwar elections since. Hariri had recently played a significant role in the development and
implementation of the Taif Agreement and was heading the reconstruction efforts in
Lebanon.118 Hariri’s landslide victory was quick to pose problems for those who
supported Damascus’s strategic intervention in Lebanese affairs. Unlike his Pro-Syrian
predecessor, Hariri heavily opposed the Syrian presence in Lebanon and was not willing
to embrace the ‘status quo.’ Despite Hariri’s discontent, Syria maintained its presence in
Lebanon after the conclusion of the Civil War, signifying the weakness of the Lebanese
national army as they were unable to ensure the withdrawal of all foreign forces.119 Syria
was known to be the “ultimate arbitrator of all things Lebanese,” and received help from
its elite Lebanese political allies.120 “The postwar state was replaced by what opposition
pundits later labeled the ‘mutual security regime’ (al nizam al-amni al-mushtarak), in
which Damascus maintained control over Lebanon, intimidating Syria’s opponents and
rewarding its allies.”121
The Syrian intelligence apparatus in Lebanon also played a significant role in
establishing Hezbollah’s dominance over resistance operations against Israel, and
ensuring that the Shia militant group had its needs met.122 Syria’s involvement in
Lebanon and support for Hezbollah continued to raise the eyebrows of the non-Shia
sectarian groups, particularly the anti-Syrian Christian opposition that demanded all
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external influenced be removed from their territory. Several Christian followers of Aoun,
the former Christian president that was exiled by the Syrians, organized the Free Patriotic
Movement (FPM) against the Syrian occupation of Lebanon.123
Furthermore, Hezbollah’s decision to compete in the Lebanese elections of 1992
was unprecedented, and a defining moment for the party’s identity.124 Under the rule of
Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah and its non-Shia electoral allies won twelve seats in this
election, including eight Shia seats.125 As a result, the Shiite group has since governed
approximately two-thirds of Shia districts and was additionally granted veto power in the
cabinet in 2008 via the Doha agreement.126 Winning parliamentary seats is accompanied
with greater access to government resources, providing the Shia community with better
living standards. While Hezbollah initially emerged as a militant group with intentions to
protect Lebanese territory from Israeli invasion, the group was quickly evolving into a
hybrid organization deeply rooted in the social and political climate in Lebanon.
The rise of Hezbollah “marked the leveling of political power among the three
main power players in the country.”127 With increasing power and influence, spearheaded
by Hezbollah, came urbanization and migration of the Shia community from the suburbs
into more cosmopolitan areas. This allowed the Shia community to significantly
contribute to the Lebanese economy, creating a change in the socio-economic living
standards.128 The parliamentary elections of 1992, 1996, and 2000 served to assemble
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political elites that were submissive to Syria’s personal interests and plans in Lebanon,
which again, alienated Christian public opinion aggravating sectarian relations.
Israel Withdraws from Lebanon in 2000
After a long, yet successful, sequence of launching Hezbollah guerilla attacks
against the Israeli militia, Israel announced the removal of its troops from Lebanese
territory on May 24th, 2000, ending 22 years of occupation.129 Hezbollah’s success in
achieving peaceful Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon heightened the group’s popularity
and approval in the region, bringing them substantial political gains. Through militant
mechanisms, Hezbollah was able to win the support of the local community, including
support from the non-Shia community, proving that they are a better representative of the
people than the Lebanese government. Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah
was deemed a hero as this occurrence united all Lebanese regardless of sect as they
celebrated the freedom from Israeli occupation. This national admiration for the Shiite
group, however, did not last long.
The Assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri
In October 1998, Pro-Syrian Christian Emile Lahoud was elected as President
which stirred some unrest with Hariri and his followers as they disapproved of the
penetration of Syrian influence in their country. In 2004, Syria’s ‘pro-consuls’ in
Lebanon ensured that Pro-Syrian Emile Lahoud received a three-year extension to his
Presidency, which the Lebanese parliament approved as a ‘one-time exception,’ even
though it was not the first nor the last time that they had done so.130 This extension
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resulted in extreme outrage and vocal opposition towards the Syrian presence in Lebanon
and the Christian president, especially by Sunni Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and his
followers. Extremely bothered by Syria’s role in Lebanese politics, Hariri resigned after
Lahoud’s extension was permitted by the Lebanese government in October 2004.131 The
UN Security Council firmly responded to the extension by passing Resolution 1559,
which called for, “among other things, the disarmament of militias (that is, Hezbollah)
and the withdrawal of foreign forces (the Syrian army).”132
Only four months following his resignation from the parliament, on February 14th,
2005, former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri was murdered in a car bombing attack along
with the lives of ten colleagues.133 The assassination was widely assumed to be the work
of Syria and pro-Syrian allies. As a result, Hariri’s assassination provoked large-scale
anti-Syrian demonstration in Beirut that was slightly successful in liberating Lebanon
from Syrian influence.134 These protests and rallies were the largest in Lebanese history
and overwhelmingly spearheaded by Sunni, Christian, and Druze communities, also
known as the March 14th Coalition or the Cedar Revolution.135
Since the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, the sectarian lines were most commonly
drawn between the Christians and the Muslims. It wasn’t until the assassination of Hariri
that the political lines were utterly re-configured to reflect a newfound sectarian
imbalance between the Sunni versus Shia Muslims. Hariri’s death split the country into
two groups: the ‘March 8th Coalition,’ which supported the Syrian regime and their
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presence in Lebanon, placing the assassination blame on the U.S. and Israel, and the
‘March 14th Coalition’ which placed the blame entirely on the Syrian regime.136 The
March 8 Coalition is majorly composed of Shia communities that support Hezbollah and
Christians that are part of the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) following Michel Aoun.137
The group is referred to the March 8th group due to the sizeable demonstration held by
Hezbollah and Amal on March 8th, 2005, out of respect for Hariri, but more largely to
show gratitude for Syria’s supposed role in ensuring peace in Lebanon.138 While
Christian Aoun followers, known as ‘Aounists,’ were actually part of the March 14th
protests, after their General was prohibited from competing in the elections in May they
shifted their support to the March 8th coalition, sharing a sense of victimization and
marginalization with the Shia.139 Oppositely, the March 14th anti-Syrian coalition is
mostly composed of Hariri’s Christian, Druze, and Sunni followers.140 Shockingly for the
first time in Lebanese history, sectarian groups that were previously enemies (such as the
Muslim-based and Christian-based political parties) united for this political occasion, as
Christian loyalties were split among the coalition groups based on who their
representative was.141 Even though confessional groups were harmonizing through the
unification of forces, the Sunni-Shia strife was quickly worsening, contributing to a
divide that is still detrimental to this day in Lebanese politics.
On the other hand, the Christian identity experienced diminishing salience in
Lebanon as the sect became less politically relevant following Hariri’s death. This
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shifting of sectarian sands portrays the continuous mechanisms of identity definition and
redefinition in Lebanon, depending on the evolving political boundaries. The deviation
away from Muslim-Christian sectarian conflict disproves the notion that sectarianism is
everlasting and innate, but rather changeable. Identity politics are prone to modification
in association with the political power relevant to the moment. The weakening of the
Christians and the simultaneous rise of Shia power served to diminish the tensions
between the historic Christian-Muslim sectarian conflict. This realization may act as an
indication that it is possible to resolve the current sectarian strife in the Arab region, as
the conflict is not rooted in religious biases as it may shallowly appear. Hence, the basis
of this shift is attributed to the modified socio-economic and political variables, alongside
the external forces involved in Lebanese politics.
After receiving international condemnation and pressure from enraged Lebanese
protesters of the Cedar Revolution, the Syrian army withdrew from Lebanon in April
2005 for the first time since its involvement in the civil war almost 30 years prior.142
Under hefty pressure from Western nations, especially the United States, Lebanon held
elections in May 2005.143 The March 14th Coalition, also known as the Cedar Revolution
consisting of Sunni Muslims, Druze, and some Christians, received victory in the
elections - capturing a significant majority in the parliament of 72 out of 128 seats.144
Walid Jumblatt, Druze leader, took action to ensure that all sects were adequately
represented by deciding to include both Hezbollah and Amal (Shia political parties) in the
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parliament.145 Jumblatt worried that if the Shia groups were not represented, they would
turn against the elected political elite and align themselves with Christian politician
Michel Aoun, who had returned to Lebanon from his refuge in France.146
The 2006 War
In March 2006, top political elite from Shia, Sunni, Druze, and Maronite sects
including Nasrallah, Aoun, Berri, Geagea, Siniora, Saad al-Din Hariri, and former
President Amine Gemayel, held a “National Dialogue” to address important issues facing
Lebanon at the time.147 The most pressing problems that were to be addressed were: “The
UN-led inquiry into the assassination of Rafic Hariri, Lebanon’s relations with Syria, and
the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for the
disarming of militias.”148 While there was strong Lebanese sentiment towards disarming
Hezbollah, the dialogue was unable to reach a firm conclusion as the Shia group applied
their defensive rhetoric, stating that they required their arms in case of another Israeli
invasion. The dialogue concluded in July after Hezbollah insistently reiterated and
promised that it would absolutely refrain from engaging in any action that would put the
summer tourist season at risk, especially at such a time of economic recession in
Lebanon.149
However, the group also promised the return of the remaining three of four
Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails. Realistically, the Hezbollah leaders and its supporters
were convinced that the group’s rising military power, aid, and arsenal provided by Iran
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and Syria would be sufficient in deterring Israel from penetrating Lebanese territory once
again. Secretary-General Nasrallah believed that this operation would receive limited
retaliation from the Israeli forces and result in a quick, impressive success that would
silence those who opposed Hezbollah’s decision to maintain arms.150 To Hezbollah’s
dismay - and Lebanon’s utter surprise – after the group launched its attack to retrieve the
Lebanese soldiers, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert decided to respond with a largescale retaliation, devoted to destroying Hezbollah as a military force. Israel was
supported by its U.S. ally, as both nations were keen to engage in a proxy war in Lebanon
intended to diminish Iran’s influence and demolish what the U.S. deemed as a terrorist
group (Hezbollah).151
In response to Hezbollah rockets that killed two in Israel, on July 14th 2006,
Israel enforced an entire naval blockade on Lebanon and sent airstrikes into Lebanon that
hit all three runways the Beirut International Airport, two Lebanese Army bases,
Hezbollah’s Al Manar television station, and the main highway between Beirut and
Damascus, Syria.152 Israel placed the blame of Hezbollah’s actions on the Lebanese
government, stating that “the cross-border raid that captured two of its soldiers on
Wednesday was an unprovoked act of war by a neighboring state,” even though the
government was unaware of Hezbollah’s intentions to take action.153 While the European
Union minorly criticized Israel for “the disproportionate use of force in Lebanon in
response to attacks by Hezbollah on Israel,” Hezbollah still received international
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condemnation from not only Western countries, but also key Arab states, including Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, for “violating Israel’s border and
snatching the soldiers, especially since Israel had unilaterally withdrawn from the country
six years before.”154
Nonetheless, Israel’s response to Hezbollah absolutely devastated the country,
destroying Lebanon’s airport and necessary infrastructure such as internal transportation.
The timing of the attack was particularly troubling as it followed Hariri’s death in 2005,
and the recent civil war. Lebanon faced severe reconstruction bills costing around $4-5
billion, and over 1,109 civilian deaths and 15,000 family homes destroyed.155 Over 78
bridges required rebuilding and would take until 2008. Lebanon’s economy relies heavily
on tourism, and as a result of the 2006 July bombings, around $2 billion in income was
forfeited at a time when the country’s national debt was $40 billion (twice the annual
GDP - one of the highest debt levels in the world).156
The majority of the country blamed Hezbollah, rather than the Lebanese
government, for meddling with Israel in the first place. The 2006 war also deepened the
already present Sunni-Shia tensions by completely splitting Lebanon into two divisions
politically – those who supported Hezbollah (largely Shia) and those who opposed it
(largely Sunni). While Hezbollah maintained a large Christian and Shia following due to
the resources and benefits they provide the Shia community (March 8 group), the Sunnis,
Christians, Druze and any others that were previously the slightest supportive of
Hezbollah after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 ultimately turned against the group,
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demanding its disarmament (March 14th group). As the March 14th coalition held power
in parliament during the time of the 2006 war, the group deemed Hezbollah’s actions
extremely provocative and a form of coup d’état, charging the Shia group of being Iran
and Syria’s Islamic pawn in their proxy war against Israel and the West.157
Following the conclusion of the 2006 war, on October 31st Hezbollah’s SG
Nasrallah posed an ultimatum to the Lebanese government. The government was to
approve of a national unity government or face retaliation with protests and blockades,
such as those on main highways and routes.158 Unwilling to give Hezbollah what they
want, especially after their role in the 2006 war, the government denied to provide the
group with what they wanted. This caused all five Shia members of the government to
abruptly depart in November, with intentions to create uncertainty regarding the
government’s legitimacy.159 Hezbollah claimed that according to the Taif Agreement
every major sect must be represented in government, and since the Shia community was
no longer represented, the government should not be allowed to function.160 As the
March 14th alliance refused to accept their opposition’s vocalization of government
failure, Hezbollah and its supporters turned to widespread demonstrations “announcing
that they would not budge until the government succumbed.”161 The lack of an efficient
government in Lebanon only worsened the relations between the Sunnis and Shias,
causing dangerous fights and several deaths between the two sects in the protests that
preceded until January.
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2006 Onwards
The government in Lebanon has continually proven itself to be an illegitimate and
weak institution that is incapable of making sovereign domestic and foreign political
decisions. Since Hariri’s assassination, the politics in Lebanon have been controlled by
Iran-backed March 8 coalition, directed by Hezbollah, and the Saudi-backed March 14
group, commanded by the Future Movement – which is led by Saad Hariri, the son of the
late prime minister. Both coalitions, in the context of the proxy war between Iran and
Saudi, possess conflicting interests in the Syrian war. To Hezbollah, a victory for Syrian
President Assad would assure that the group receives numerous military and economic
benefits, along with the expansion of Iran’s political influence in Lebanon. On the other
hand, the March 14th coalition views the failure of the Assad regime as a way to diminish
Hezbollah’s increasing power in Lebanese politics and expel Iran’s dominance.162
Additionally, Hezbollah’s political involvement in Lebanon has heightened the
sectarian tensions in the region and exacerbated the Sunni-Shia divide. Although the
Shiite group emerged as a force committed to combating Israel, it has much evolved.163
Its political members include government ministers, legislators, and local counselors,
while its military wing is heavily involved in the backing of Shia Regime of Bashar alAssad in the Syrian war, and more recently plays a role in Yemen and Iraq.164
Hezbollah’s deep engagements in the neighboring Syrian war have upset many Lebanese
civilians, as they have faced the repercussions of the party’s actions. For instance, in
November 2015 in an attempt to target Hezbollah, the Islamic State executed double
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suicide bomb attacks in Beirut, killing forty-three people and harming over two
hundred.165
Resentment and disputes over Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria “led to the
resignation of the Lebanese cabinet in 2013 and a subsequent ten-month long political
vacuum,” once again portraying the weakness of the political institutions in Lebanon.166
The sectarianism caused divisions over election law reforms, resulting in postponed
elections from June 2013 to November 2014, and then to June 2017.167
Nonetheless, Hezbollah maintains a sizeable Shia following in Lebanon due to the
positive contributions made to the Shiite community, including building an array of
institutions and providing public services such as health centers, schools, and clinics,
among others.168 Taking family members into account, the group has an average payroll
of 400,000, providing Hezbollah salaries to a quarter of Lebanon's’ Shias/ approximately
one-tenth of the entire population. On the other hand, a substantial portion of Lebanese –
particularly the Sunnis – view Hezbollah’s engagements as detrimental to the country and
prayed for its defeat in the 2006 war.169 The Christian community has split between both
sides, creating political deadlock and paralyzing the government.
The tensions in the regions and the Syrian civil war have significantly altered the
mechanisms of inter-sectarian mobilization in Lebanon. What was once interest-based
and political mobilization has shifted into more identity-based and religious modes of
mobilization. Both the Sunni and Shia communities are perceiving a newfound existential
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threat in addition to defending one’s resources and power. This fight for the survival of
one’s very sect has accompanied the encompassing sectarian rivalries that are only
worsening in the region.
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3
Underdevelopment in a Politically Sectarian Landscape
Corruption in every Lebanese Corner
Since the termination of the Lebanese civil war in 1990, Lebanon has experienced
consecutive political paralysis and internal waves of crises that have negatively impacted
the country’s economy and ability to function. The management of the country has long
been executed with the underlying theme of how best to maximize personal profits while
doing the bare minimum. The corruption, as a result, has reflected poorly on several
aspects of the economy and Lebanon itself. The nature of this exploitation in government,
as politicians squabble over who reaps the most benefits, has led to weak provision of key
public services, such as waste disposal, reliable electricity, clean water, transportation,
healthcare, construction, natural resources, and social assistance programs.170 To this day,
Lebanon has yet to target investments and innovations that would provide sustainable
infrastructure to prevent and help diminish the crises that amount. This demonstrates the
level of neglect towards ambitious planning and tending to the public. The way in which
the Lebanon’s sectarian-based government was constructed, as “a system that drives
politicians and leaders to act sectarian or else risk missing a promotion of being punished
by their constituents,” has played a significant role in the corruption present today.171
Since Lebanon’s independence, the country has been unsuccessful at developing
a legitimate government institution that fosters a sense of citizenship and national
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identity. The irrelevance of large-scale structural modifications crucial to producing
tangible advancements to all municipalities has led to a lack of faith in the state’s weak
institutions. The power-sharing arrangement has allowed the Lebanese state to neglect its
obligations and duties, as each citizen turns to their sect constituent for rights and
representation, “opening up the space for political parties, charities, religious
organizations, NGOs, and various branches of the UN to fill the needs of communities
and keep them afloat.”172 Consequently, the Lebanese citizens have no reason to trust
their government, thus revealing its role as an illegitimate institution.
This chapter aims to provide insight into the ways in which government
corruption and political sectarianism in Lebanon has infected the country’s ability to
function and, as a result, deteriorated the path to development. Simultaneously, I aim to
portray the ramifications of underdevelopment, and how they have recently worsened the
relations between certain sects, such as the Sunni-Shia divide. The involvement of
foreign states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the U.S. has contributed to the
political stagnation through exacerbating the Sunni-Shia divisions in Lebanon. Thus, the
amalgamation of corruption, political sectarianism, and foreign intervention, all band
together to inhibit Lebanon’s ability to develop, while also allowing the Sunni-Shia
divide to reach a breaking point.173
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Political Stagnation + a Proxy War174
When Hariri resigned there was this uneasy general feeling that the
economy might crash, or that we’re going to have another void where our
government should be. This created a sense of uncertainty for the people and their
jobs. It shook the stability of the country and people’s confidence in the future of
the nation. Just before Hariri resigned everyone was hopeful because we had
recently elected a President and things were starting to look up... But this was just
another reminder that Lebanon is not a stable country. – Karim, AUB student
Lebanon’s government experienced a political vacuum starting May 25, 2014,
when Michel Suleiman concluded his role as the Lebanese president. It wasn’t until
Maronite Michel Aoun was elected on October 31, 2016, that this vacuum came to an end
- over two-and-a-half years later.175 The Lebanese political parties and parliament
underwent “46 rounds of voting and multiple backroom discussions” before finally
agreeing on Aoun for the candidacy.176 The failure to conduct a quick and accurate vote
in a timely manner was largely due to the rival factions blocking one another.177
Newly elected Maronite President Aoun is part of the Iran-backed, pro-Syrian
Assad Regime, March 8th alliance, along with Shiite group Hezbollah and its
followers.178 This newly formed government also consists of Sunni Saad Hariri as Prime
Minister, who ironically leads the opposing pro-Western, Saudi-backed March 14th
alliance, along with his Sunni, Christian, and Druze followers.179 This post-2006 vertical
split in the country between the March 8 and March 14 alliances represents the growing
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sectarian tensions in the government that must be managed in order to establish a credible
government and reinvigorate the concept of Lebanese citizenship. For the most part, these
political parties have failed to overcome their differences, widening the Sunni-Shia split
in Lebanon.
During Lebanon’s long political paralysis, the neighboring Syrian civil war was
rapidly escalating, pulling Turkey, Iran, Russia, and the United States into its enclose.
With the heightened presence of the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Lebanon
quickly became a pawn in their chess game, worsening the ongoing Sunni-Shia divide.
Aoun is largely criticized by Hariri’s Sunni supporters as his election is viewed as a win
for Hezbollah and Iran’s plan of Shiite power consolidation in the Middle East. Majority
of the Sunnis in Lebanon disapprove of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, and are
demanding that the group give up their arms. This regional rivalry has aggravated
polarization between Lebanese representations, resulting in a disruption of the country’s
delicate balance of power. The distinct domestic agendas, each influenced by opposing
foreign actors, have made the political crises close to unresolvable within Lebanon. This
newly elected government, with Michel Aoun (Maronite) as President and Saad Hariri
(Sunni) as Prime Minister, is left with many domestic and international challenges to
face.
The following section serves to provide the reader with an understanding of
regional perspectives and foreign influences that play a current role in Lebanon’s political
stagnation.
***
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Iran. Predominantly Shiite Iran has interests in growing its power in the region,
inevitably destabilizing multiple countries in the process. Iran-backed Hezbollah is no
longer just a domestic political group intended to help Lebanon fight Israel, but is now an
Iranian proxy playing a key role in sectarian conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.180 Iran
maintains its substantial annual funding to Hezbollah, providing the group with $700-800
million worth of financial aid in 2016-17, via suitcases of cash by flying it over Iran
and/or trafficking it through Syria and Turkey.181 With the help of Hezbollah, Iran has
been expanding its scope of influence in the region. Lebanese members of the March 14th
alliance oppose Iran’s increasing role in Lebanon.
Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a predominantly Sunni state that has been in conflict with
Shia Iran, and opposes its regional military arm, Hezbollah. The Lebanese Prime Minister
Saad Hariri is heavily supported by Saudi Arabia as they are both Sunni actors
advocating to “cut off Iran’s hands in the region.”182 Riyadh has recently been more
involved with the sectarian conflict in Lebanon, encouraging the Sunni Prime Minister
Hariri to resign on Saudi territory as a way to expose the overbearing involvement of
Tehran in Lebanon through its proxy, Hezbollah.183 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is an
important ally of the U.S. for security and critical energy supplier reasons, especially
under the current Trump administration, as “he [is] eager to distance himself from his
predecessor’s pro-Iranian inclinations and repair U.S. tensions with Saudi Arabia and
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Israel from the Obama years.”184 Simultaneously, Saudi Arabia is persistent in pushing
Washington to develop a more aggressive attitude against Iran.185
Syria. The Tehran-backed Hezbollah militia is deeply engaged in the Syrian war in
support of the Shiite Assad regime, with approximately 6,000 to 8,000 fighters deployed
there.186 Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria is opposed by a significant portion of the
Lebanese population as it is causing sectarian strife in the region, especially angering the
Lebanese Sunni population. Hezbollah would also benefit from a funding increase if the
Assad regime wins the Syrian Civil War.187 This would give Iran more influence in the
region, and raise the chances of Hezbollah-affiliated companies to ‘win construction
contracts in Iraq and Syria.’188
United States. While the U.S. may not be directly involved with Lebanese affairs, it’s
engagements with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria indirectly impact Lebanese policy. Iran’s
power consolidation in the MENA region is viewed as a threat to U.S. security interests.
In October 2017, U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Royce stated,
“Hezbollah is Iran’s leading terrorist proxy and it is only growing more dangerous. It
now has an arsenal of more than 100,000 rockets aimed at Israel, [...] has taken hundreds
of thousands of lives, including American lives. We send a strong message that the
United States will not allow this threat to go unchecked.”189 As a result, especially under
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the current Trump administration, the U.S. has sided with Saudi Arabia to diminish Iran’s
power, which ultimately affects Lebanese stability.190
***
The current situation in Lebanon is highly volatile due to Hezbollah domination
and Iranian influence. Escalated tensions between the sectarian groups in Lebanon led to
Hariri’s recent resignation from his role as Lebanese Prime Minister in Saudi Arabia on
November 4th, 2017. These efforts were coordinated with U.S. President Donald Trump
and Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman.191 In a televised interview, Hariri stated that
“Iran controls the region and the decision-making in both Syria and Iraq,” and is
devastating Lebanon through its involvement with Hezbollah.192 As Lebanese politician
Yassine Jaber stated, “there’s one question anyone who wants to put pressure on Lebanon
should remember: Do you want another failed state on the Eastern Mediterranean?”193

A Devastated Economy Here to Last
I went to a top university in Lebanon, studied International Business, and
graduated at the top of my class. Yet, I was making nothing at my first job. I made
$800 a month, which I spent on gas, parking, and basic necessities - and that’s
not even considered a meager amount in Lebanon! No one is happy and everyone
spends the majority of their time and income on clubbing. A large amount of
Lebanese citizens have moved abroad and become expats. Why do you think they
would leave? There are no job opportunities for them here - there is no chance at
making a living and having a sustainable lifestyle with a family.
– Sarah, Lebanese American University Graduate (LAU)
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Lebanon maintains a service-oriented, free-market economy that is heavily
dependent on the banking, tourism, and real estate sectors.194 Yet, to Lebanon’s
discontent, the economy is extremely fragile and incapable of growth as it’s been subject
to a six year neighboring war in Syria, financial crises, and an influx of Syrian refugees.
The Lebanese civil war left a massive dent in the country’s economy as Lebanon had
large debts to pay and even larger reconstruction efforts to fund. The country’s
inescapable high level of corruption, with Lebanon “ranked number 146 on the
Corruption Monitor Index for 2014 (1 being least corrupt),”195 has prevented the
economy from growing more than a sparse 2% in the past two years.196 As of 2016, the
country maintains one of the largest debt-to-GDP ratios in the world, with “Lebanon’s
government debt skyrocketing to 144 percent of GDP - only topped by Japan and Greece
[...] Lebanon relies on inflows of outside capital to maintain the peg.”197 Power and
wealth in Lebanon are highly concentrated within entrenched elites, creating soaring
poverty lines and worsening sectarianism between municipalities.
Saudi Arabia-Iran Proxy War on Lebanese Economy
The Saudi-Iran cold war has manifested itself in several ways in Lebanon,
negatively affecting the economy. When Lebanon disregarded the 2016 attack on Saudi
Arabia’s embassy in Iran, Saudi retaliated by aborting plans of $4 billion of aid to
Beirut.198 This severely hurt Lebanon’s economy as it chiefly depends on remittances
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(approximately billions of dollars) from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries.199 Similarly, several countries that are part of the GCC
followed Saudi’s lead and contributed to Lebanon’s punishment by releasing travel
advisories against Lebanon, with the United Arab Emirates going as far as imposing a
travel ban.200 Other GCC countries “terminated the service and residency permits of
Lebanese employees and immediately deported them.”201 Many GCC governments and
authorities have banned or advised their citizens against travelling to Lebanon due to
stated ‘safety concerns’ regarding Lebanon’s domestic political instability. Yet, while it
is true that Lebanon faces shaky security, the underlying regional proxy war is a main
contributing factor to the hostility of GCC countries. Nonetheless, the travel bans and
weak safety circumstances in Lebanon have devastated the tourism sector and the
economy.
The banking sector is also walking a tightrope as Lebanese analysts predict that
there was little to no growth in 2017.202 The banking sector is highly reliant on depositors
and investors as they play an essential role in upholding the country’s power - however,
this dependency has become extremely dangerous as several investors, especially GCC
countries, have reduced their assistance. From 2003-2015, the financial aid of three Gulf
countries “accounted for 76% of new foreign direct investment projects in Lebanon, [...]
remittances averaged about 20% of the country’s annual GDP over the past 10 years,
with 60% coming from the Gulf countries.”203 As political instability worsens and the
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war in Syria continues, investors have become more reluctant to invest in Lebanon’s
unpredictable economy. This has led foreign and domestic investors to locate alternative
destinations and companies abroad, such as in Cyprus.204
Consequences of International Sanctions on Lebanon’s Stability
The Lebanese people have taken the brunt of international condemnations and
economic sanctions as a result of Hezbollah's actions, which inevitably impairs the
country’s economy.205 The U.S., Israel, France, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and
the Arab League (excluding Lebanon and Iraq - both with substantial Shia populations),
have designated Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.206 Since the U.S. Treasury’s
designation of Hezbollah in 2012, the U.S. has taken multiple countermeasures to restrict
Hezbollah’s access to finances.207 In December 2015, President Barack Obama signed the
Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act (HIFPA),208 which was intended to
restrict Hezbollah and its Lebanese Al-Manar TV channel’s access to banking in
Lebanon, inhibiting the organization’s financial operations.209 The act imposed sanctions
on Hezbollah’s international and domestic fundraising networks and threatened to close
the accounts of individuals or businesses caught funding Hezbollah, including members
funding the group through drug trafficking and money laundering.210
The Lebanese economy is significantly dollarized, with “65% of deposits in
Lebanon in U.S. dollars, and 72% of loans denominated in U.S. dollars,” and thus
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depends on their U.S. correspondent banks to operate.211 The Lebanese banks’ primary
concern is that U.S. correspondent banks, “which face huge fines if found to be dealing
with people or companies sanctioned under anti-terrorism financing legislation, might
finally decide Lebanese banks are too risky to do business with.”212 The HIFPA sanctions
directly threatened this relationship between the Lebanese and U.S. banks. As a result,
the Lebanese central bank issued instructions to close accounts of individuals or
institutions linked to Hezbollah to avoid being denied access to international financial
markets.213 Terminated accounts included those of ‘Hezbollah parliamentarians, as well
as the group’s major hospitals such as Al-Saroul al-A’zam, and foundations such as the
Martyrs Foundation and Imdad Committee.214 This act was thus successful in the closing
of hundreds of Lebanese bank accounts associated with Hezbollah, yet simultaneously
affected institutions that provided social service support to the Shia community.
While it is in the U.S. interest to completely restrict Hezbollah’s finances,
Lebanon is torn between desiring the elimination of Hezbollah and maintaining its
existence because of the substantial Lebanese Shia population that supports the group due
to the services Hezbollah provides them.215 Hezbollah is very much integrated into
Lebanon’s political system, with its leverage increasing through its veto power over
cabinet decisions.216 Hezbollah also spends approximately $600 million a year in
payments and social services provided to Shia, Sunnis, and Christians lacking support
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from the government. Taking family members into account, Hezbollah has an average
payroll of 400,000, providing salaries to a quarter of Lebanon's’ Shias, or approximately
one-tenth of the entire population. Hezbollah’s social services, such as health centers,
schools, clinics, charitable institutions, no longer cater to the entire community due to
deplenished funding.217
The HIFPA sanctions have resulted in small victories per U.S. interests in
blocking Hezbollah’s funding, yet the group continues to obtain ample funds to deploy
substantial militias in Lebanon and Syria, and smaller forces to Iraq and Yemen.218 On
the other hand however, the sanctions have had an extensive negative impact on the
stability of Lebanon and its banking sector. After the implementation of HIFPA in 2015,
Hezbollah retaliated against the bank’s decision to close Hezbollah-associated accounts
by detonating a bomb containing 15 kg of explosive material outside the headquarters of
Lebanese Blom Bank - the second largest bank in Lebanon and one of the institutions that
had complied with HIFPA.219 The bombing caused large-scale material damage but no
casualties. Hezbollah’s response to Lebanon’s application of the U.S. HIFPA law was
that “it would lead to bankruptcy and a rift between a large segment of the Lebanese
population and the banks,”220 while also accusing the banking sector of starting a
financial war against them.221
The Lebanese banking sector has been at the core of an intensifying crisis. The
Blom Bank incident is representative of the threat these U.S. laws and sanctions pose to
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the Lebanese economy, devastating its stability.222 Inevitably, Hezbollah’s association
with the attack resulted in increased political and sectarian tensions, heightening
instability as the Lebanese community increasingly splits between those in support of
Hezbollah and those in support of the Sunni Prime Minister Hariri.223

The Absence of Basic Necessities: Electricity, Trash, Water, Transportation
Electricity
It’s really hard for people to be change agents because every time they try,
the government just doesn’t listen. My friend’s mom works for Electricite Du
Liban (EDL). EDL stopped working for the entirety of December because the
government didn't pay their salaries. They’ve been protesting for a couple weeks
now, but the government still hasn’t paid them. Kilo aal fadi! (It is all a waste of
time). This affects the workers who aren’t receiving the salary they’re relying on,
and it affects our people that are now dealing with a lack of electricity. Nothing is
stable. You can lose your job in a day and have no money to rely on. It is
absolutely terrifying. – Rana, LAU Graduate
The Lebanese administration has continuously struggled with providing
government services to its municipalities, with one of the oldest challenges being the
generation of reliable electricity. This persists even today in the 21st century. Electricity
is no longer the luxury it once was, but a fundamental necessity that the government is
incapable of providing due to the political paralysis, weak governance, and corruption.
Electricity cuts are frequent in Lebanon, with three-hour blackouts a day in
Beirut, and up to twelve hours per day in the rest of the country.224 The extreme
recurrence of energy cuts leaves the Lebanese citizens no choice but to pay for personal
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generators. This is both pricey and destructive to the environment as they are fueled by
diesel.225 Up to 30% of electricity generated in Lebanon is self-generated, leaving these
citizens with costs of two separate electricity bills - one for EDL, and the other for the
generators that cost twice the price.226 The average Lebanese household consumed
$1,300 on electricity in 2013, “in a country where the gross national income per capita is
$9,800, according to World Bank estimates.”227 Private companies must also rely on
generators for electricity, increasing company costs and inevitably hurting Lebanese
businesses.
Electricite du Liban (EDL) is Lebanon’s state-owned, primary provider of
electricity, “mandated with the responsibility of the generation, transmission, and
distribution of electrical energy in Lebanon.”228 The presence of a single electricity
provider in Lebanon that manages over 90% of the sector is a main source of the energy
issue. EDL’s monopolization of the electricity industry has resulted in a substantial
shortage of electricity generation that is required to meet citizen demand. Whenever
EDL’s electricity is faulty or cuts off due to corruption in government, the Lebanese
citizens have nothing else to rely on, unless they own a costly generator. Further, the
Lebanese government allocates 15% of its annual expenditures, equivalent to $2 billion a
year, on subsidies to obtain fuel for EDL.229 In contrast, the government only spends 7%
of its funds on education, and 9% on health.230 With the government spending this much
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of its resources on electricity, one would expect the system to be flawless. Evidently, it is
far from that. As Salim, AUB graduate and Civil Engineer, says when addressing the
energy situation,
The Lebanese government has no problem renting fuel from Turkey for
$1.8 billion, but realistically, with that money they could create their own power
plants. They are unable to do this unfortunately, because politics and money get
in the way. An excessive amount of money is dedicated to this sector with no
tangible results. If the government decentralized the electricity industry, it would
allow other people to develop solutions to the problem. Yet, politicians and
decision makers choose not to privatize these utilities because they wouldn’t be
able to profit off it. What ends up happening is that the money that is supposedly
intended for investing in EDL’s production goes straight into the pockets of
politicians.
As Salim makes clear, each politician is concerned with reaping the largest profits off of
their contract with EDL, that it often stagnates the process and the company’s ability to
function. According to Agence France Presse, “more than $500 million ended up in the
pockets of leaders, ministers, and entrepreneurs” that was intended for investment in the
energy sector.231 Political elites make deals with companies that make offers to pay them
large amounts to uphold their contract. Several political elites have even utilized the
distribution of free energy to their constituents in attempts of re-election, leaving 55% of
EDL bills uncollected.232 Today, EDL’s collective deficit is approximately $27 billion,
comprising 40% of Lebanon’s public debt.233 With the significant amount of money that
goes into sustaining EDL’s functionality each year, the government should be able to
create a more sustainable mechanism for eletricity generation.
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Additionally, the refugee crisis in Lebanon has made the cost of electricity
increasingly higher, with costs rising from $206 million in 2013 to $432 million in
2014.234 According to a study conducted by The Ministry of Energy and Water in
partnership with the UNDP, the influx of hundreds of Syrian refugee families into
Lebanon, and their consumption of 486 kW on a daily basis has cut 5 hours of electricity
a day for Lebanese households.235 Blackouts are largely prevalent in the countryside,
where the majority of Lebanon’s impoverished communities and the refugees reside, and
can sometimes last up to a full day. Moreover, the sectarian strife in Lebanon has an
impact on the energy sector. For instance, in 2012, the parliamentary committee proposed
authorizing permanent contracts to EDL workers, providing them with long-term
employment security. However, this proposal did not pass as Christian representatives
accused this decision of benefitting more Muslims than Christians.236 In Lebanon, this is
considered to be a bad thing as sectarian balance is required in most industries, and this
proposal would upset the balance of power in the energy sector. Once again, corruption,
divisions, and disagreements among rival politicians in the Lebanese government
infiltrate the path to development and stability.
On a more positive note, there are now prospects for Lebanon to become an oilexporting country after the government awarded several companies gas exploration
licenses in December 2017.237 The IMF had approved the creation of the Lebanese
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National Oil Company much before 2017, yet unsurprisingly, due to the government
corruption there have been many delays in initiating this process.238 The Lebanese
government refrained from investing in oil exploration on the city’s coast, even though it
was estimated to contain “96 trillion cubic meters of gas and 865 million barrels of
oil.”239 It’s still unclear whether the oil companies will be able to extract anything off the
Lebanese coast, but in the case that they are successful, this could be significant for
Lebanon’s economic growth and energy production.
Trash
When asked about the origin of the trash crisis:
Tfih (gross), it’s all political! The government used to dispose of all the
trash in the Jumblatt’s Druze area called Naameh, even though it wasn’t the
Druze’s trash. In addition to that, the government did not provide any aid to the
municipality or manage any health concerns. Understandably, the Druze got
frustrated, and Jumblatt told the administration that they should go throw their
trash in their own hometown instead of destroying his. This led the government to
start dividing the trash into different areas based on representation! One of the
areas was Muslim dominated called Costa Brava, and the other was a Christian
area called Bourj Hammoud. Neither of those areas was a good place to dispose
of the trash as one is near the beach in Beirut, and the other near the airport. It is
awful for the environment, and the entire city STUNK! If the representatives in
government cooperated and pooled funds, I’m sure they could’ve found a more
economical and environmentally conscious way to dispose of the trash. But of
course, sectarian politics permits such things from happening. – Tanya, AUB
Student
Following the Civil War, the Lebanese government has largely focused its waste
management efforts on Beirut and Mount Lebanon, abandoning the remaining
municipalities to manage the waste themselves without financial or technical support.240
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While trash disposal has been an issue in lower-income areas for several decades, the
trash crisis recently reemerged as a massive problem due to the collapse of the waste
management system in 2015. The closing of the city’s landfill led to excessive pilling of
trash on the streets, including in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Since the start of the crisis in
2015 until June 2017, the Lebanese fire department has dealt with 4,426 cases of open
waste burning in Lebanon, with the number of reports exceeding over 500% in the last
two years.241 According to the World Health Organization, Beirut’s air pollution has
exceeded the safety limit by 70%, leading to over 1,500 pollution-related deaths a year.
In July 2015, the vile overflow of trash became too abominable to ignore after the
city’s landfill closed, causing thousands of Lebanese protesters to take to the streets of
Beirut and form a non-political, and non-sectarian movement known as “You Stink.”242
The citizens have long overlooked the corruption and inaction in the Lebanese
government, but the ongoing trash problem sparked a strong sentiment of discontent and
extensive frustration, inviting the “largest public action” Lebanon has seen in many
years.243 While the protests began calmly, several enraged protestors engaged in
damaging property and even starting fires in the capital. The security forces responded by
discharging tear gas and rubber bullets, resulting in 400 injuries (99 of which were
policemen) and 32 arrests.244 In reality, the protests regarding the trash represented
frustration and anger of Lebanese citizens over a culmination of issues that all stem from
the sectarian nature of government. This includes the political vacuum that persisted for
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over a year, shaky electricity, government corruption, millions of refugees, and the
neighboring civil war that Lebanese groups, such as Hezbollah, are involved in.
The citizens were most irritated by the situation considering that environmental
activists in Lebanon had been extremely vocal about the landfill being full for quite a
while. Yet, the government failed to consider alternative arrangements.245 As Lebanese
journalist Tamara Qiblawi said, “The infuriating thing is it that the government knew the
exact hour the landfill would expire. They knew the exact hour the trash crisis would
begin, yet they did nothing about it. And when it struck, the entire conversation among
the political leaders was about how to divide the spoils.”246 This further highlights the
corruption present in government, as politicians base their decisions and actions not on
the needs of their constituents, but rather on the profits they will be making. The system
works like this: if the contract with a waste management company costs $1 million,
politicians will say it costs $5 million and take the remaining $4 million to divide upon
themselves. If the politicians are willing to share the profits, things get passed, if not, they
get blocked.
Although the protests of 2015 and 2016 seemed to have put an end to the trash
problem as authorities claimed that they had developed a solution, as of 2017, the
garbage crisis came back under the radar of the citizens as a result of trash burning and
waste disposal in the sea. Several international actors accused the Lebanese government
of environmental and health conditions and attempted to help Lebanon solve its trash
crisis through funding and foreign interventions, but all efforts failed. The European

245
246

Ibid.
Richard Hall, “Lebanon's got 99 problems and trash is just one.”

63

Union funded two sorting plant operations in Beirut that could manage up to 45% of the
waste.247 Yet, the administration exploited these resources and neglected the maintenance
- finding ways to cut corners to extract money for themselves at the sake of the
environment. Instead of creating a viable solution with the EU funds and external
assistance, the contractors turned to shifting the trash to coastal dumps, with an
“estimated 2 million metric tons of waste” sitting on the shore of the Mediterranean sea,
producing liquid pollution that is negatively affecting the marine wildlife.”248 By
disposing of waste in the sea, Lebanon is breaching the 1995 Barcelona Convention
agreement to preserve the marine environment of the Mediterranean.249
Additionally, due to the absence of a suitable disposable plant, many have taken
to burning the trash on streets, near homes, schools, and hospitals, leading to what was
referred to by the health minister as a “health catastrophe.”250 On one occasion, the trash
burning was so severe and consistent outside a school in Naameh that the school had to
call for emergency measures and cancel school for a couple weeks.251 The Human Rights
Watch (HRW) released a report in 2017 titled, “As If You’re Inhaling Your Death,”
outlining the severe short and long-term health risks of open burning of waste in
Lebanon.252 According to the HRW, the burning of waste leads to exposure “to fine
particles, dioxins, volatile organic compounds, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon, and
polychlorinated biphenyls, which have been linked to heart disease, cancer, skin diseases,
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asthma, and respiratory illnesses.”253 The government is legally compelled to ensure that
its citizens’ health needs are met, yet they have not even provided their people with
information regarding the potential risks of open burning and how to take safety
precautions, leaving many families unaware how to protect their children. Hence, the
Lebanese government is incapable of providing incentives or taking initiative to find
sustainable, and potentially cheaper, solutions to the trash issue despite international
assistance.
Water
Decreased amounts of precipitation, an awfully hot climate, and consistently
inadequate management of water resources have created near-annual water shortages and
crises in Lebanon.254 Shortages in the water supply to central cities such as Beirut have
been firmly declining, while in less prominent regions, steady water supply averages
from 8 to 13 hours a day in the summer and winter periods, correspondingly.255 Lowerincome families that reside in the North and Beqaa areas, where the influx of refugees is
highest, are most vulnerable as they lack connection to public water networks.256
Furthermore, the enormous arrival of Syrian refugees has only drained the country’s
renewable water resources. The Lebanese government has been incapable of supplying
water and sanitation services “mainly due to the spatial and temporal variations in water
availability, delayed implementation of critical storage, distribution and treatment
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infrastructure and the incomplete institutional reforms needed to enable sustainable
operations and cost-recovery of sector institutions.”257
There once was an abundance of snowfall and precipitation in Lebanon, but the
recent climate changes have affected the volume of water available, producing lowerthan-average water levels that contribute to the yearly water shortages. According to
Rafik Hariri International Airport’s meteorological department, during winter of 2016,
“rainfall was 509.4mm for Beirut, lower than the yearly average of 825 mm.”258 In 2014,
Lebanon witnessed its driest year with no rainfall or snowfall since the 1980s. Obtaining
sufficient precipitation has become a severe issue, especially for citizens involved in the
agricultural industry. Farmers in Lebanon primarily rely on the rainfall that fills their
rivers and wells to irrigate their plantations, accounting for 60% of the country’s water
expenditures. As a result, in recent consecutive years these farmers had no choice but to
“pump groundwater for irrigation, [of which] if the drought continues, only five percent
of groundwater will be left.”259 The public infrastructures available to capture rainfall are
extremely limited, with only 2 dams and 650 public wells. Oppositely, there are over
50,000 private wells inefficiently utilized for domestic water demand and irrigation many of which have completely dried up or are suffering from salinization.260 Thus the
majority of citizens, including those with private wells, are dependent on water trucks
and government resources. Evidently, there is a discrepancy between the low levels of
rainfall captured and the large amounts of water needed for daily use. The scarcity of
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water has allowed for the independent furnishing of water through unplanned digging of
wells in various municipalities, which is both expensive for the civilians and detrimental
to the environment.261
From my personal experience having lived in Lebanon, the deteriorating water
supply levels have forced residents to develop defense mechanisms or alternative ways to
manage the issue each summer. For instance, the building I live in maintains a salt-water
system, in which all the tap water is composed of undrinkable salt water. Other citizens
live in complexes or buildings that substitute conventional water purifiers with Chlorine the cheap and harmful alternative. As a high intake of concentrated Chlorine may cause
damage, the Lebanese households must refrain from cooking with it, turning to bottled
water each time they want to cook. As you may imagine, continually relying on bottled
water for cooking and drinking becomes an economic burden. Several Lebanese
households must also pay two separate water bills: one for the government, and the other
to private companies that provide them with water during droughts.
Even under the best circumstances, the Lebanese government struggles to regulate
and refine its infrastructure for managing water resources. According to Fadi Comair,
Director General at the Ministry of Energy, “70% of the water that moves through
Lebanon’s 16 rivers ends up in the Mediterranean, and 48% of the water [they] do
manage to collect ends up getting lost due to leakage and poor infrastructure.”262 Lebanon
requires a more integrated approach to water management. One solution recommended
by several activists is the creation of a “closed water-use cycle,” in which wastewater is
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not discarded but rather viewed as a reusable, purifiable resource.263 If Lebanon were to
exploit its natural resources to their full potential with better water management, the
country would be capable of substantially increasing its water supply.264 Until then,
citizens that can afford to pay for purified water will face high costs, while others begin
storing the water they do have through reducing their consumption.
Transportation
Beirut was once known as the ‘Paris of the Middle East’ for its astonishing
functionality and unique culture of openness in the region. Alas, the civil war completely
transformed the country and its infrastructure, comprehensively impairing the cities,
roads, and train operations. Political tampering and intervention in Lebanon have largely
constrained the capabilities of the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation.265
According to the ministry, 65% of the road networks are in mediocre condition, while
20% are doing very poorly.266 The ministry is unable to make beneficial modifications
chiefly due to the meager financial resources and “poor maintenance, which is bestowing
high costs on rehabilitation and reconstruction of many roads."267
A significant implication of lacking a sustainable and effective transportation
system and requisite infrastructure is worsened congestion on the streets. Lebanon’s
traffic catastrophe might not sound so bad, but it has negatively impacted the daily lives
of commuters and the economy. Beirut is especially overpopulated, as 1.3M out of
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Lebanon’s 4.5M citizens live in the capital.268 The majority of these residents must
depend on private vehicles of transportation to get around as a consequence of having no
public transportation. According to Urban Transport Development Project, “passenger
vehicles reached 434 per 1,000 in 2012, ranking Lebanon at 17th place worldwide [....]
indicating that 50% of Lebanese households own 1 car, while 25% own at least 2.”269 The
extremely high numbers of vehicles on the road create a profusion of traffic, especially
during peak hours. Moreover, there are substantial economic costs of urban congestion
which equate to 8% of Lebanon’s GDP, approximately $3 billion.270 Citizens that are
stuck in traffic all day have less time to dedicate to their jobs, activities, and chores.
Lebanese citizens have also incurred high costs for maintaining and operating their own
private vehicles, including fuel, taxes, insurance, and car service. Driving in Lebanon is
also extremely risky - with little to no traffic lights, distinct streets with specified
directions, and liberally enforced rules. Finally, the rise in the number of vehicles on the
road poses environmental concerns, with the transportation sector making up 25% of the
country’s CO2 emissions.271 Even freight services have no choice but to make deliveries
in their sizeable trucks on the streets as there are no existing railways, increasing street
traffic and worsening the transportation inefficiencies.272
Lebanon is in critical need for reconstruction efforts targeted towards developing
an effective public transportation system. Sustainable infrastructure would relieve the
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country from excessive traffic in exchange for lower levels of stress and higher levels of
productivity. Transportation systems would also provide a solution to the parking
problem that is very present in Lebanon today. With barely any place to park on the
streets, several citizens take to parking on the streets, contributing to the congestion and
chaos.

The Neighboring War and Refugee Crisis
People in Lebanon think that the Syrian refugees are taking their jobs, but they
shouldn’t forget that these people didn’t choose to come to Lebanon, they feared
for their families and safety. There should be a way to help them, but how do you
expect our government to do that? Take a look at the size of our country versus
the size of Jordan. We don’t have the space to hold 4 million refugees! Forget
space, we don’t have water or electricity… do we even have a President right
now? – Dana, AUB Student
The outbreak of the neighboring Syrian crisis in 2011 has manifested itself as a
critical economic and social threat to Lebanon and its stability. The threat is chiefly
centered on the influx of Syrian refugees, and the additional challenges they pose to an
already underdeveloped Lebanon. According to the UNHRC, there are now
approximately 1.5 million registered Syrian refugees, which is about a quarter of
Lebanon’s population, along with an estimated 3 million undocumented Syrian
refugees.273 This makes Lebanon the largest receiver of Syrian refugees in the world. An
estimated 86% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon have settled in some of the poorest and
municipalities in the country, such as Wadi Khaled, Hermel, and Badghan, where 66% of
vulnerable Lebanese communities reside, worsening the already insufferable conditions
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that “pre-date the Syrian refugee crisis.”274 The Beqaa valley is most troubled by the
presence of the Syrian refugees, as there are over “770 informal tented settlements
hosting around 410,000 refugees.”275 In addition to the Syrian refugees, Lebanon also
hosts 450,000 Palestinian refugees residing in refugee camps all over the country.276 The
World Bank anticipates that the Syrian refugees will cost Lebanon’s already devastated
economy an additional $7.5 billion to provide services and basic necessities.277 Aside
from economic costs, the neighboring Syrian war and the substantial presence of refugees
has had a negative impact on the local Lebanese communities as there is observed
competition for jobs, services, security, resources, and education, among other factors.
Firstly, the Syrian War has taken a huge toll on the Lebanese economy through
rivalry over employment and decreased trade. Prior to the war, a substantial plurality of
Lebanese citizens living in lower-income regions have struggled to obtain and uphold a
job, let alone receive an adequate amount of pay to support their family. These economic
conditions are aggravated by the incoming refugees as they are now competing for jobs.
Many Syrian refugees are offering to work for cheaper pay than the Lebanese laborers,
which has allowed them to occupy 60% of the labor force in Lebanon.278 The
employment of Syrian refugees instead of lower-income Lebanese families has created
tensions with the host population, as they view these immigrants as taking their jobs.
Additionally, before the Syrian war, Lebanon was a large importer of Syrian goods as

Lina Khatib, “Repercussions of the Syrian Refugee Crisis for Lebanon,” Carnegie Middle East Center,
December 10, 2014.
275
Andrew Purvis,“Top UN humanitarian officials visit Syrian refugees, call for support for Lebanon,”
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,” September 16, 2014.
276
“Lebanon,” United Nations Relief and Works Agency, Last Updated July 1, 2014.
277
“Sectarian Conflict in Lebanon.”
278
Mario Abou Zeid, “A Time Bomb in Lebanon: The Syrian Refugee Crisis,” Carnegie Middle East
Center, October 6, 2014.
274

71

they were less costly than domestic goods. The outbreak of the war, however, led to the
closure of the Syrian borders, forcing the Lebanese to turn to overpriced local
products.279 The combination of harsher employment conditions and domestic goods
rising in price has been detrimental to marginalized local communities that have been
neglected by their state.
Education services in Lebanon are also facing complications as a result of the
presence of the Syrian refugees. The Lebanese school systems are attempting to enroll the
Syrian students, yet most schools only have enough room for less than 30% of them.280
The Syrian students are struggling to assimilate into the Lebanese curricula, as it is taught
in mainly English or French and most of the refugees were previously educated in
Arabic.281 Many Syrian refugee families are also incapable of paying tuition fees. The
Ministry of Education is trying their best to accommodate the Syrian refugee students by
offering courses at later times, while other international organizations such as the
UNHCR, Save the Children, and Amel Association are also providing restorative classes.
Nonetheless, the shift in the schooling environment is causing tensions between the
students. The disparities between Lebanese and Syrian levels of education and systems
have affected the Lebanese students, as they are no longer the top priority in their own
country’s education systems. With substantially larger numbers of students enrolled, the
teachers are scrambling to attend to students needs with severely limited funding and
resources. Additionally, the presence of humanitarian organizations and nonprofits in
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Lebanon intended to aid the refugee population has triggered antagonisms from
undervalued Lebanese communities. In the perspective of these vulnerable local
communities, they are frustrated with the neglect from such organizations and their
government in comparison to the aid centered on refugee communities.
Lower-income Lebanese communities have also faced challenges in receiving
appropriate healthcare services, as the state is known to be incapable of providing
healthcare to all its civilians, and private healthcare is known to be expensive. Prior to the
closure of the Syrian border, Lebanese communities living near the borders used to
access healthcare centers in Syria for cheaper fares.282 Unfortunately, the outbreak of the
Syrian crisis meant that these vulnerable Lebanese families must now turn to more
expensive local services even though they cannot afford it. The presence of the Syrian
refugees suffering due to a lack of crucial nutrition, water, and sanitation has caused
tensions within the host populations.283 Several healthcare organizations have prioritized
providing healthcare to the Syrian refugees due to their unstable conditions, leaving the
vulnerable Lebanese communities to feel not only entirely neglected by their state and
people, but also as second-class citizens in their own country.284 It is a thoroughly
unfortunate situation for both the refugees who did not choose to flee their country but
had to do so for their safety, and the vulnerable Lebanese host communities that have
been deserving of state support for a very long time, but were unable to receive aid due to
the political gridlock and corruption.
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Due to the unbalanced and insufficient governance for the arrangement of social
services, several of these lower-income areas, especially the bordering regions, have
experienced a widened sense of insecurity. The security of the refugee camps is rapidly
diminishing, with the camps regarded as “safe havens for terrorists, with refugees no
longer seen as victims.”285 This perception is largely due to the “explosions, suicide
bombings, Syrian army shelling of border villages, and kidnappings of over 30 Lebanese
military and security personnel to use them to negotiate the release of 300 Islamists held
in Roumieh prison.”286 No form of security or police forces is present. This resulted in
host communities monitoring refugee campsites as a form of informal security assistance,
which has been to the disadvantage of the refugee population. For instance, in Badghan,
the citizens take turns monitoring the campsite and enforced a curfew for the Syrian
refugees.287
According to a HRW report, there are now around 45 municipalities that impose
curfews on Syrian refugees, even though there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that
these curfews will create any order or security.288 In fact, the curfews have had the
opposite effect by contributing to the growingly antagonistic environment for the Syrian
refugees. On the other hand, Hermel, a highly underdeveloped municipality located
nearest to the Syrian border, has had to rely on Hezbollah for aid to help manage the
refugee presence.289 These communities experiencing the brunt of the refugee crisis are in
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desperate need of aid from the state institutions. However, the government is incapable of
providing such assistance, causing vulnerable communities to resort to militant political
parties such as Hezbollah, informal clans, and religious figures.
Finally, the Syrian conflict has had a polarizing effect on Lebanon, heightening
the sectarian tensions between the Sunni and Shia communities.290 There have been
violent outbreaks between Sunni and Shia Lebanese in different regions as the Sunni
communities are largely against Shiite group Hezbollah’s military support for the Shia
Syrian regime. The Sunni communities believe that as long as Hezbollah continues to
interfere in the neighboring war, it will only aggravate the conditions and bring in more
refugees to Lebanon. The looming hostility between certain Lebanese and Syrian
communities is deteriorating, as many Lebanese turning to needless violence against the
refugees, and some even threatening to kill them.291 Attacking and harming the Syrian
refugees won’t solve the refugee crisis, but instead contribute to the instability and misery
present. Nontheless, the vulnerable host population has reached a breaking point - to
which the administration must quickly develop a solution.

290
291

“Sectarian Conflict in Lebanon.”
“Lebanon: Rising Violence Targets Syrian Refugees,” Human Rights Watch, September 30, 2014.

75

4
Political Sectarianism through a New Lens: The Case of Iraq
Sectarianism has been an indispensable element of Lebanon’s cultural and
political composition since the French established a consociational system, also known as
a power-sharing arrangement, in 1936 prior to their departure. Lebanon’s consociational
government structure subsists as a pursuit to resolve interreligious conflict and uphold
religious tolerance. It was first formalized through the National Pact of 1943, an
agreement constituting Lebanon as a multi-confessional nation, and further modified
through the Taif Agreement of 1989, which attempted to re-distribute the confessional
divisions to represent modern demographic realities. This structure required all public
service roles to be distributed equitably along the same religious divisions, allowing
sectarianism to persist in every corner of Lebanese life. While the purpose of this
consociationalist government system was to ensure that each of Lebanon’s 18 recognized
religious groups received representation in parliament based on their demographic
percentage, this system allowed for the marginalization of underrepresented religious
communities.
The previous chapters have provided a more in-depth analysis of the ramifications
of this formalized government structure, and how it inhibits Lebanon’s development by
fueling sectarianism rather than nationalism. Yet, it is essential to consider how this
power-sharing arrangement may have benefitted Lebanon, especially given the
dysfunctionality of the surrounding Middle Eastern nations. Since the commencement of
the Arab Spring in 2011, several pluralistic, heterogeneous Arab nations such as Libya,
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Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia, have experienced substantial street demonstrations demanding
the overthrow of their regime, leading to the complete collapse of their government
institutions.292
Contrary to its neighbors, Lebanon’s fragile central government managed to
withhold itself from crumbling at a particularly trying time. This leads me to believe that
there may be some positive implications of the power-sharing arrangement, in the sense
that it is the sole reason Lebanon will never have a dictator as it prevents one singular
actor or group of people from achieving exclusive political control. In this case,
stagnation and corruption in Lebanon can be viewed as superior to the alternative, if the
alternatives are foreign control or dictatorship. Several theorists and journalists have gone
so far as to praise the consociational power-sharing system in Lebanon, claiming that
“despite its evident flaws, [it] could just conceivably offer a solution that ensures a
degree of stability.”293 Lebanon’s unique survival skills have even spiked several
scholars’ attention to the consociational arrangement, “driving a renewed interest in
sectarian power-sharing systems as a possible model for [Arab countries’]
rehabilitation.”294 While there is no single solution to the majority of malfunctioning
Arab governments, Lebanon’s power-sharing arrangement appears to be the lesser of the
evils.
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On the other hand, a handful of scholars have raised doubts regarding the
Lebanonization, or implementation of the Lebanese model, elsewhere. These hesitations
arise due to the Lebanese state’s consistent corruption, mounting public debt, political
paralysis, and weak governance that has allowed for the emergence of sectarianism and
the marginalization of minorities, among many other factors. Theorists claim that perhaps
an authoritarian figure is best for these Arab nations attempting to achieve stability
because dictators take necessary means to suppress marginalized sentiments. Thus, in
attempt to effectively analyze whether the power-sharing arrangement is the most viable
government structure for Lebanon and similar pluralistic Middle Eastern states, this
comparative government chapter will serve as a case study into Iraq - a Middle Eastern
state that has experienced massive waves of turmoil over its past years.
Iraq is a particularly fascinating country to apply as a case study because it has
witnessed a shift from a dictatorship to a consociational democracy in the past decade.
The Lebanese and Iraqi political situations present critical parallels, particularly
following the U.S.-led ousting of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Ba’athist administration in
2003. The political structure in Iraq that was created after Saddam’s decline is often
referred to as the “Lebanonization of Iraq,” or as author Melani Cammett describes the
discourse: “the recurrence of instability combined with entrenched external meddling in
the domestic politics.”295 In other words, after Hussein was forcibly removed from his
position as dictator, a power-sharing arrangement, similar to the one in Lebanon, was
implemented instead. Hence, both countries have witnessed the institutionalization of a
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power-sharing system that enabled the materialization of sectarian parties and reinstated
identity politics as a way of life.
There are three probing questions that must be addressed in order to evaluate
Lebanon’s political constitution: a) is the power-sharing arrangement a legitimate
government structure?, b) how has this consociational government indirectly, or directly,
contributed to the politicization and prominence of sectarian relations and antagonisms
between ethnic groups?, and c) is a power-sharing arrangement the most viable
government structure for multiethnic, pluralistic Middle Eastern states? Thus, in order to
provide explanations for the above questions, a case study into pre-and-post Saddam Iraqi
government structures will share some insight on the legitimacy of such governmental
structures. The Iraqi case is important to understand as it maintains several similarities to
the Lebanese situation. Firstly, Iraq and Lebanon both host multiethnic societies, with
Iraq’s most prominent divisions being among Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, and Kurds,
while Lebanon’s are among Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, and Maronite Christians.
Secondly, both states have experienced influential waves of foreign intervention, with the
U.S. and Iran playing a key role in Iraq’s government structure, and Syria, Israel, Iran,
and more recently, Saudi Arabia playing a pivotal role in Lebanon. Furthermore, both
states have experienced the emergence of ‘terrorist’ groups or insurgencies, such as ISIS
in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon, following the marginalization of a major religious sect.
This chapter will provide analysis into the conditions under which a pluralistic
Middle Eastern state beyond Lebanon, in particular Iraq, existed with a consociational
system. The investigation intends to present another outlet through which the pros and
cons of a power-sharing arrangement are observed, providing insight into whether this
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government structure is the most feasible for Middle Eastern states dominated by
religious plurality, or whether these illegitimate institutions facilitate a sectarian nature,
such as in Lebanon. Furthermore, an examination of Iraq under a dictatorship will reveal
the positive and negative implications of living under an authoritarian rule in the Middle
East, in attempt to answer why some scholars view a dictatorship as a necessary means of
stability in the region. My analysis of the situation based on the research to be presented
is that power-sharing arrangements divided along religious lines allow for the
politicization of identity when power, resources, and territory are at stake. The
politicization of identity thus creates a vacuum for sectarianism to emerge, as ethnic
groups are marginalized and competing for influence in their state. This is evident
through the current volatile situation in Iraq that followed the U.S.-led removal of
Saddam Hussein, and the implementation of a consociational democracy. Before delving
into the conditions in Iraq, the next section aims to provide the reader with a detailed
background on consociationalism, highlighting the most prominent theories associated
with its creation.

Understanding Consociational Democracies
Power-sharing arrangements, also known as consociational democracies, are a
relatively recent phenomenon that have been sporadically successful when applied to
some states, while reaching opposite results in others. Consociational theory is amid the
most noteworthy methods applied to multi-ethnic societies that desire to democratize.296
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Initially, consociationalists claimed that power distribution along ethnic or religious
identities is the most efficient way to diffuse intergroup antagonisms and solidify a
democracy.
Dutch political scientist Arend Lijphart, widely known for his 1977 publication of
Patterns of Democracy, coined the concept “Consensus Democracy” and largely
advocated for the adoption of consociationalism in pluralistic nations. Lijphart argued
that “if [political leaders of plural societies] wish to establish or strengthen democratic
institutions in their countries, they must become consociational engineers.”297 This theory
was originally created as a solution for ethnic, class, and religious dissections in the
Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland.298 In the case of these four states, peace
and political stability were achieved, leaving consociationalists to believe that it was this
proposed structure of government that led to their success, even though many scholars
predicted the multiplicity would inhibit it.
In his book, Lijphart pinpoints four factors of consociationalism which he views
as capable of reducing ethnic and religious tensions, and advises them for
demographically divided states. These four focal propositions are299:
1) The Grand Coalition: Each nation government is to consist of representatives
from all the prime religious, linguistic, class, or other ethnic groups. Executive
power is to be split among the representatives.
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2) Proportionality: each demographic faction must have corresponding
representation in the government and critical political positions. Each confession
is to receive relatively equal government benefits.
3) Autonomy/Decentralization: Ensuring that each ethnic community receives
sufficient autonomy and the right to self-governance.
4) Mutual Veto-Rights: representatives of “each demographic group are to be
granted the right to veto political actions that are deemed contrary to their group
interests.”300

These propositions will only succeed if the interests of all ethnic communities are
competently and uniformly demonstrated in a grand coalition; if one of the groups feels
as though its interests are not adequately represented, this could lead to marginalization
which would inevitably erode the validity of a consociational government system.301
Lijphart additionally suggests that “these principles are most likely to succeed when a
strong case can be made that national unity is in the best interests of all groups in conflict
[...] for example, groups at war may find cooperation under nationalistic terms to be
beneficial when a mutual threat, external to their nation, is perceived.”302 Northern
Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement of 1998 is routinely referenced by consociationalists as
an example of antagonistic political groups that were able to concur on power-sharing
principles, which has led to a significant reduction of intergroup violence.
In theory, the principles of power-sharing governmental structures are intended to
be inclusive of all different ethnicities present to reduce intergroup violence and hatreds.
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It is even true to state that since the establishment of the Taif Agreement, Lebanon’s most
contemporary power-sharing arrangement, intergroup brutality has largely dwindled.
That is not to say, however, that consociationalism yields no negative repercussions. As
the previous chapter on underdevelopment suggests, the institutionalization of a
consociationalist system in pluralistic Lebanon has paved the path for sectarianism,
reinvigorating the vicious cycle of corruption, lack of basic resources, and a faulty
economy, among other things. The following case study on Iraq hopes to provide insight
on the consequences of a consociationalist government and the ways in which Iraq’s
circumstances erode the validity of Lijphart’s propositions.
Iraq: before and after
Note: I have attempted to include credible first-hand accounts gathered by journalists,
non-governmental organizations, blogs, and interviews to illustrate that sectarian violence
and political identity in Iraq are less a result of innate religious animosities and more a
result of shared protective responses to the terror and marginalization produced in a time
of political instability and civil war.
Iraq is particularly significant to observe because it provides an understanding of
sectarianism under Saddam’s reign and the way in which it evolved afterward due to
U.S.-led intervention and the establishment of a power-sharing arrangement. A brief
overview is first presented, followed by an in-depth glance at the sectarian conditions.
A Brief Overview of the Situation in Iraq
Saddam Hussein rose to power in the 1970s “on a wave of nationalist,
revolutionary sentiment that had been sweeping the Middle East for years.”303 Under his
initial reign, Iraq rapidly became one of the most advanced and developed Arab nations
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as Hussein invested Iraq’s substantial oil profits into agricultural production, free
education, universal healthcare, sustainable infrastructure, and the creation of new
industries.304 Simultaneously, however, Hussein was a ruthless ruler involved in the
killings of thousands of women, children, minorities, or anyone who opposed his
leadership, with no regard to human rights violations. He plunged Iraq into long-lasting,
destructive wars with its neighbors, forcing his soldiers to fight for what he believed in,
inevitably weakening his country. Through his terroristic tactics, Hussein managed to
silence those who wished to speak, allowing him to maintain order and stability in Iraq.305
Saddam was also a Sunni Muslim in a country where the Sunni Arabs were a minority.
While Saddam maintained a secular rule, the majority of his Ba’ath party was of Sunni
descent. Under Saddam’s rule, the party underwent several substantial persecutions of
Shia and Kurd communities, allowing for the marginalization of these dominant sects.306
Iraq witnessed a significant shift in March 2003, beginning with the U.S.-led
military occupation of Iraq, codenamed Operation Iraqi Freedom, which toppled Saddam
Hussein and his Ba’ath Party government, resulting in the outbreak of the Iraq war.307 In
April 2003, U.S. brokered discussion with Iraqi representatives to help shape the
country’s transition to a newfound democracy intended to replace the displaced Baathist
government.308 Paul Bremer was appointed by the U.S. to be the civil administrator in
Iraq, and lead the path to ‘de-Baathification’ in which he destroyed all institutions present
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under Saddam and banned former members of Ba’ath party from holding government
positions. Bremer also utilized ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy in brokering the alternative Iraqi
state, which had severe repercussions in worsening the ethnic divide. Instead of viewing
Iraq as a nation that desperately needed conciliation policies, Bremer treated Iraq as a
nation filled with minorities that are averse to coexistence; thus, the only correct way to
occupy the nation in his mind was to pit the ethnic groups against one another.309 This is
evident through Bremer’s creation of the Iraqi Governing Council, a power-sharing
arrangement, in which members were chosen via sectarian demographic rations. The UN
lifted economic sanctions against Iraq in May 2003 and stated their support for the U.S.led administration.310
The U.S. initiated trials against Saddam in Iraqi court, which eventually convicted
him of treacherous human rights violations and declared his punishment to be death,
making him “the first modern Arab ruler to be tried and executed for his crimes.”311
Saddam’s execution on December 30, 2006, ‘created a new schism in the Sunni-Shiite
relations’ in Iraq.312 Right before he was killed, the room was filled with Shiite religious
chants as many previously marginalized Shia were happy to witness the death of a man
who had imposed so much suffering on their sect.313 On the other hand, the Sunni
minority who were placed on a pedestal by Saddam blamed the Shia for killing their ruler
and solidified his execution as an integral symbol for the Sunni struggle that was to
follow, turning Saddam into a martyr. The sectarian form in which Saddam was executed
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instantly worsened the Sunni-Shia rift, and intercommunal violence became prominent.
U.S. military deployment ended in 2011 with the departure of U.S. troops.
Saddam’s Iraq: Pre-2003
It is easy to idealize Hussein’s rule, arguing that a brutal dictatorship is better than
the terrorism, corruption, sectarianism, and weak governance that exists in Iraq today. In
reality, with or without Saddam, Iraqis have never been able to escape their struggle.
Their suffering has just shifted from living under a dictatorship to living under several
smaller ones. Under Saddam Hussein’s reign, Iraqi citizens suffered greatly through
repression tactics, torture, and killings. Saddam’s cruel repression tactics are evident
through the Al-Anfal Campaign and the suppression of the 1991 Rebellion.
Hussein was notorious for his attempts to ethnically cleanse the Kurds living in
Iraq prior to 2003. In 1988, Hussein launched a series of chemical weapon attacks,
known as Al-Anfal Campaign, to eliminate the presence of thousands of Iraqi Kurdish
rebels residing in the North that were battling for their autonomy and freedom.314 In a
matter of a few months, Hussein had exterminated approximately 100,000 Kurds,
including Kurdish families and refugees living in resettlement camps.315 The U.S. was
aware of the human rights violations and use of chemical weapons, yet were hesitant to
take action as they were supporting Hussein at the time during his ongoing war against
Iran. After 2003, Al-Anfal was primarily used as a justification for international
repercussions against Iraq, and is a crucial reason why the Iraqi Kurds were granted
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sovereignty following Hussein’s downfall. This incident is just one amongst many others
for Kurds periling under Saddam’s reign.
Similarly, in 1991 following Iraqi defeat in the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War,
many Kurdish rebels in the north and Shia Islamists in the south took advantage of
Hussein’s vulnerability to rebel against his rule.316 The Shiites and Kurds were
perpetually marginalized under Hussein, and were under the impression that they would
receive U.S. backing and military support as President Bush had encouraged them to rise
up.317 Unfortunately, U.S. assistance fell short, and within weeks, Saddam had not only
defeated the rebels but slaughtered thousands in response. Hussein’s assertive aptness to
crush any uprising held against him allowed him to strengthen his hold over Iraq and
delivered a clear message that any rebels will face severe repercussions. For this reason,
the majority of marginalized sects living in terror refrained from uprising in order to save
their lives and families. In this way, Saddam’s repression tactics may have
simultaneously suppressed sectarianism from surfacing.
While Iraq faced ethnic tensions prior to the U.S.-led occupation in 2003,
Saddam’s authority inhibited conspicuous sectarianism from emerging. There was a
mutual sentiment of coexistence between the Sunni and Shia, especially in more densely
populated cities flourishing with populations of various ethnic and religious minorities.318
Approximately a third of Iraqi citizens had engaged in intermarriage; a concept that is life
threatening in contemporary Iraq.319 Prior to the 2003 U.S.-led occupation, evidence of
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notable waring between the country’s religions, sects, ethnicities, or nationalities was
extremely limited.
Sami Ramadani is an Iraqi-born scholar that was politically exiled from Saddam’s
regime. Nonetheless, Ramadani campaigned against U.S.-led sanctions and the Iraqi
occupation, and writes about the underlying tolerance between religious groups that
existed under Saddam:
[Referring to pre-2003 conditions] One of the greatest testaments to the
tolerance that exists between the various communities in Iraq is that Baghdad still
has up to a million Kurds, who have never experienced communal violence by
Arabs. Similarly, 20% of Basra’s population in Sunni. Samarra, a mostly Sunni
city, is home to two of the most sacred Shia shrines. Every tribe has Sunnis and
Shias in its ranks. Every town and city has a mix of communities.
The most serious sectarian and ethnic tensions in Iraq’s modern history
followed the 2003 US-led occupation, which faced massive popular opposition
and resistance. The US had its own divide-and-rule policy, promoting Iraqi
organizations founded on religion, ethnicity, nationality or sect rather than
politics. Those who claim Iraq can only have peace if it is divided into three states
do not appreciate the makeup of Iraqi society - the three regions would quickly
fall under the rule of violent sectarians and chauvinists. Given how ethnically and
religious mixed Iraq’s regions are, a three-way national breakup would be a
recipe for permanent wars in which only the oil companies, the arms suppliers,
and the warlords will be the winners.320
Similarly, Riverbend, the pseudonym of a Baghdadi blogger, recounts the high
levels of tolerance in Iraq prior to 2003:
[The U.S. goes on and on about Iraq’s history and how Sunnis and Shia
were always in conflict and I hate that. In Baghdad before the war, one could live
anywhere. We intermarry, we mix and mingle, we live. We build our churches and
mosques in the same areas, our children go to the same schools. No one asked
about religion or sect [...] or bothered with what was considered a trivial topic:
are you Sunni or Shia? You only asked something like that if you were uncouth
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and backward. Our lives revolve around it now. Our existence depends on hiding
it or highlighting it - depending on the group of masked men who stop you to raid
your home in the middle of the night.321
As Ramadani and Riverbend state, coexistence under Saddam’s Iraq was not only
a possibility but a way of life. Even though Saddam’s regime was chiefly Sunnidominated, he still allocated a significant amount of representation to Shia and other
socioeconomic minority groups in order to repress any protests. While Hussein was a
ruthless ruler who slaughtered anyone who threatened his power, he did so
indiscriminately; for the most part, as long as one stayed out of Saddam’s way, it was
possible to live a semi-bearable life. Political affiliation under Saddam’s reign was
“largely based on secular ideologies [...] it was considered taboo to inquire about or
divulge one’s religious persuasion.”322
U.S. Involvement and Interference
It is critical to understand the role the U.S. played in Iraq’s demise. U.S.
intervention and involvement in Iraq was a direct factor of the poor living standards
before 2003. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, which is believed to be an attack
encouraged by the West, the U.S. retaliated by imposing harsh economic sanctions on
Iraq for the next 12 years, which inevitably stifled the economy, employment, and
income, making the state a terrible place to live. According to UNICEF, the U.S. and UN
sanctions against Iraq caused an estimated half a million children, equivalent to 30% of
Iraq’s children under five, to die of malnourishment due to the lack of food and
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medicine.323 When America intervened once again in 2003 to remove Hussein from his
position, the Iraqis didn’t care to defend their country because it had become so terrible to
live in, allowing the U.S. troops to take control.324 Thus, the U.S. played a significant role
in worsening the situation in Iraq prior to 2003 and then appearing as the saviors when
they returned years later to save the citizens from the misery they had contributed to.
A Vulnerable State Divided: Post-2003
With foreign intervention and a power-sharing arrangement that has exacerbated
sectarian brutality, contemporary Baghdad is starting to look a lot like Beirut. The Iraq
Governing Council (IGC) was the first institution created in 2003 based on a powersharing arrangement. Similar to Lebanon’s structure, the amount of representation was
based on demographic sectarian realities, with 13 Shia, five Sunnis, five Kurds, one
Turkmen, and an Assyrian.325 This immediately made identity politics in post-2003 Iraq
the norm rather than an oddity because the structure of the governmental system became
based on sectarian divisions. As previously mentioned, Paul Bremer, the U.S. appointed
civil administrator in Iraq, spearheaded the formation of the IGC and employed divideand-rule tactics such as sectarian appointment. Bremer also required that all state-issued
documents reveal the declared sect of the Iraqi citizens, thus entrenching identity politics
in the post-2003 institution.326 The IGC, as a result, realigned the power dynamics in Iraq,
radically shifting the power in favor of the Shia population. This was a crucial moment
for previously politically deprived Shia population as it not only altered the future of the
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nation, but also dramatically shifted the balance of Shia power in the Middle East, which
historically favored the Sunnis.327
Furthermore, Bremer engaged in comprehensive ‘de-Baathification’ policies that
inordinately harmed the Sunnis who had once held the majority of power under Saddam’s
Baathist government. One of Bremer’s policies was the large-scale dethroning of Sunni
social and military elite from high-status positions demoralized the freshly vulnerable
Sunni population, and undermined their role in the new Iraq.328 Additionally, an
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) report reveals that over 50,000 Sunni
citizens were discharged from governmental positions, solely based on their ranking in
Saddam’s Ba’ath party.329 This left massive numbers of the Sunni population
unemployed, including teachers who were senior Ba’ath party members, “which left
children without instructors until they could be replaced by non-Ba’ath Party members
[...] the new teachers were less experienced, and often Shiite Muslims, deepening the
resentment among Iraqi Sunnis who saw Shiites as taking all the good jobs.”330 Even
worse, many Sunnis that were penalized for their associated with the Ba’ath party had
only joined in order to be considered for certain job positions.331
Prior to Saddam’s overthrow, Iraq’s army and military were known to be one of
the most capable in the Middle East. As part of Bremer’s de-Baathification, the U.S.
disbanded the army, causing disillusioned Sunni soldiers to become a part of the
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insurgencies. De-Baathification inevitably paved the path for the rise of Sunni armed
resistance and insurgencies as a means to defend their sect from abolition, contributing to
the rise of the sectarian Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) - later known as ISIS. While the U.S.
scrambled to reassemble an experienced military from scratch, many of the newly
dismissed Sunni ex-Ba’ath party members and militants joined ISIS as a form of reprisal.
Ironically, the U.S.-generated Iraqi army quickly became obsolete, and “today 2,875
American service members are in Iraq to advise, train, and assist Iraq’s military so it can
defeat ISIS,” even though the U.S.’s de-baathification policies assisted ISIS’s recruitment
and establishment.332 The disbandment of highly-trained Sunnis that were part of
Saddam’s army and now part of ISIS emphasizes the adeptness of this insurgency.
ISIS thrives of the mobilization of Sunni dissatisfaction, which is largely fueled
by the corruption and exploitation of the Shia-dominated government policies.333 ISI’s
rogue incumbency provoked the ethnic cleansing of Christians and Assyrians from Iraq
and played a crucial role in enforcing geographic segregations of ethnic groups.334
Intermarriage was no longer common under ISIS’s reign of terror, and fragmentation
became a commonly accepted way of life. ISIS has been occupying mostly Sunni
populated areas since its conception, including the notable city of Mosul, and
manipulated Iraqi citizens to believe they will be safer under their control.335 Many
individuals currently residing in Mosul under ISIS control told Vox reporters that “they
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preferred life now in the besieged city.”336 ISIS has been slyly exploiting Sunni citizens
to gain support by allowing tribal, local Sunni armed groups to control the occupied
areas, making it seem as though the insurgency’s presence is barely visible.
Consequently, this strengthens ISIS and increases the tensions against the Shia majority.
This also creates a vicious cycle - Sunni action triggers an aggressive Shiite response,
which persuades more Iraqi Sunnis to retaliate against their government.
When the U.S. officials captured Saddam in 2003, they thought it was an
accomplishment to celebrate, for they perceived the seizure of this dictator to be a victory
against authoritarianism and the path to spreading democracy. In reality, however,
Saddam’s death exacerbated the sectarian tensions in Iraq, with the violence reaching a
peak in 2006-2007, also known as the outbreak of Iraqi civil war, when casualties
exceeded the deaths of tens of thousands.337 In February 2006, Al-Qaeda - a Sunni
organization- bombed the al-Askari Mosque, which is believed to be one of the Iraqi
Shias most sacred sites. This set off a trend of Shia attacks and Sunni responses. The
UNHCR reported that since the bombing of the al-Askari mosque, over 370,000 Iraqis
have been dislocated, raising the number of Iraqi refugees to over 1.6 million - which was
later increased to 4.7 million in 2008, only two years later.338 A Red Cross report released
in 2008 announced that the humanitarian conditions in Iraq were among the gravest in the
world, with millions of citizens dependent on inadequate water sources, poor electricity,
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and insufficient access to basic necessities.339 Is this starting to sound like Lebanon in
1975 yet?
Wael Al-Sallami is a Sunni-Muslim Iraqi citizen who published a first-hand
account titled, ‘I Grew Up In Iraq During Saddam’s Worst Days - Here’s What Life Was
Like,’ in which he details his experience before and after Hussein’s regime. Sallami
clearly portrays the ramifications of U.S.-led armed interference when he says,
Instead of living safely in poor conditions, Iraqis became somewhat wealthy, but
lost all measured of personal safety. Where once they just had one tyrant to be
afraid of, now they have hundred more! Even keeping their mouths shut, which
used to keep them safe, didn’t help anymore. People were dying for having the
wrong religion, place of birth, or even the wrong name! The year 2006 [when
Hussein was killed] was worse than 1991 and 2003 combined. Militias took over
the streets, and it was chaos. Iraq was safe for most of the Sunni before 2003, but
was hostile towards Shia and Kurds, depending on their affiliations. After 2003,
the Sunni descended to become the oppressed minority while the Shia took control
of the central government.340
Further, the manifestation of sectarianism became evident through the
demographic divisions that encompassed Iraq. By 2007, the once pluralistic city of
Baghdad was split into disparate homogenous communities based on religious
identification.341 Several families and individuals have fled from regions where their sect
is the minority to more religiously homogeneous areas that appear to be safer; a situation
that didn’t exist prior to U.S. occupation and the establishment of a consociational
‘democracy.’ The map below (Table 2) displays Baghdad’s diverse religious make-up in
2005, with mixed neighborhoods dominantly shown in yellow. The right side of the map
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shows Baghdad just two years later in 2007 after Sunni/Shia ethnic cleansing had taken a
toll. Red dots represent the bombings, death squads, and militias, and it is evident that the
coexistence represented by yellow areas have been significantly reduced. Violence has
become a conventional aspect of daily life in Iraq due to the increasing amounts of
sectarian attacks.

Table 2: Ethno-religious cleansing. Source: Vox342
Iraq’s Shia dominated government run by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki from
2006 to 2014 has only further aggravated the tensions between the ethnic groups. alMaliki has convinced the Iraqi Sunnis that government will not benefit them, which is
counterproductive in overcoming ISIS and threatens national unity. Instead of having a
religiously tolerant Prime Minister that is pushing for peace and reconciliation between
the Sunni and Shia at such a critical time, Prime Minister Nouri has done nothing to
affirm his care for the minority ethnic group.
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Identity Politics in Iraq: The Evolution of a Sunni Identity
The way in which Sunni identity exists today was non-existent in Iraq prior to the
previous decade. Since the creation of the Iraqi nation-state in the 20th century, everyone,
regardless of ethnicity or religion, was part of an ‘Iraqi entity’ and shared a sense of
belonging to the mutual homeland. Currently, sectarian rivalry in Iraq has reached new
lows, chiefly due to the way in which power and influence in this nation was divided
amongst its people. It wasn’t long after Iraq’s establishment in 1921 that discussions
regarding Shiite disregard and marginalization became a relevant discourse, yet even
then, tolerance and coexistence was the norm between different sects for the 80 years to
follow. Sectarian identity was not particularly pertinent in political mobilization, but
rather other ‘frames of reference that were politically dominant.’343 The significance of a
sectarian identity became relevant in 2003, among the many changes that Iraq witnessed.
The chief forces that opposed Saddam in 2003 were ethnosectarian parties, such
as the marginalized Kurds or Shia. While the U.S. occupation forces deserve a substantial
amount of the blame for entrenching sectarian identity as the key indicator of Iraqi
politics, it is essential to recognize that these ethnosectarian parties, such as the Shia that
opposed Saddam, have wanted a power shift in their favor even before 2003. The U.S.
aided these groups by imposing a government structure that promoted political divisions
along religious lines. This was in the Shias best interest as they were the largest
demographic majority in Iraq, so the power-sharing arrangement was understood to
benefit them the most. The formerly oppressed Shia were long awaiting a situation in
which they hold a substantial amount of control and could finally speak their mind. To
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the Sunnis, the Shia that accumulated power after 2003 weren’t just political actors who
happened to be Shia - but instead they were politicians whose political perspectives were
deeply rooted in promoting the influence of their sect. Thus, when the new governmental
structure was instituted, the Sunni had hesitations and concerns about the raison d'etre of
the new political regime, and in little to no time, these suspicions were reaffirmed
through the policies and decisions made by the Shia elite.344
As a result of the power divisions along sectarian demographic lines, Sunnis
became aware of their 20% minority in Iraq and its association to second-class privileges
and lessened power - an awareness that ceased to exist prior to 2003. Under Saddam’s
rule, the Sunni in the Ba’ath party were untouchable, even though their demographics
haven’t changed.345 In Iraq today, the Sunni view their minority demographic reality as a
loss of power and have encompassed the identity of the victimized or marginalized as the
Shia once were. It’s hard for the previously privileged Sunnis to accept their minority
because it’s directly representative of the meager amounts of power and influence they
hold in Iraq. All of a sudden, it didn’t matter how capable, intelligent, or hard-working
they were - their numbers spoke for them and determined their future in the nation. The
Sunnis thus rejected the legitimacy of the government institution and viewed the post2003 order as a complete lie.
Oppositely, the Shia and Kurds welcomed the institutional change with open arms
as it worked directly in their favor. The once irrelevant Shite now have the leading stakes
in power - and even though the Iraqi government is near obsolete and widely unpopular,
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the Shia are most likely to defend its honor and preach to its legitimacy. It becomes
evident once again, that power-sharing arrangement allows for the crystallization of a
religious identity into a political one, and place the strongest emphasis on identity
politics. Fanar Haddad, an expert and author on Iraqi politics and sectarianism, best
explains the evolution of a previously non-existent Sunni identity in Iraq in an interview
with Vox346:
The parallel we've always drawn with regards to Sunni identity is a
parallel with race relations. There wasn't a coherent form of identity, like the
American notion of whiteness as the ‘normal’ American view, a ‘default setting.’
Sunnis didn't see themselves as a having a perspective before 2003. It was not a
Sunni view; it was the norm, the Iraqi view. Come 2003, it was a bit of a rude
awakening. [...] a lot Sunnis were completely oblivious to the deeply held Shia
notions of identity they were just hearing about.
Sunnis weren't concerned with or particularly knowledgeable about
sectarian dynamics because it wasn't an issue for them. They did not perceive
themselves to be on the losing end of sectarian dynamics, they weren't even aware
of sectarian dynamics! So this is a game that they only started playing in 2003.
The other thing is that, in 2003, they had to form a Sunni identity whether they
liked it or not because the system mandated it. The system required and made
communal identity the central political marker. So they had to find that
presentation along identity lines. Now you’ve got quite a strong sense of Sunni
identity, one that has been anchored in a sense of victimhood.347
Haddad’s statements draw the audience’s attention to the powerful impact of ingroup perceptions when crafting a collective identity. Once the Sunni began to perceive
themselves as victims of a demographic minority, they ascribed their identity to highlight
the newly-established dynamics that they believe have ‘cheated’ them. The Sunni claims
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of being victimized by an oppressive Shia state is especially emblematic because of its
transnational implications in today’s world. Religion, a part of one’s cultural identity that
used to be cherished, has now become a political identity with no means to disassociate
from it.
An Analysis: Implications and Criticisms of a Consociational Democracy
With a failed power-sharing arrangement that has been unable to encourage
economic and political recovery, many began to refer to the Iraqi climate in 2010 as the
Lebanonization of Iraq: “a derogatory term, a hint at imminent civil war, political
deadlock, foreign domestic involvement, and a warning that the state would fall apart like
Lebanon did from 1975-1991.”348 Similar to Lebanon, contemporary Iraq has armedpolitical groups and insurgencies, and a government that is incapable of supporting its
citizens with basic needs, such as security, electricity, and water, among other things.
Analyst Louay Bahry refers to the two countries as ‘junior democracies at work,’
discriminately capable of protecting the majority. Other scholars view the system as a
consensus democracy that struggles to achieve success due to a suffocating Arab political
way of life.349
There is a need for further examination of the efficacy of consociational
democracies in pluralistic Middle Eastern states. While intended to promote peace by
providing a platform for each ethnic division in the country, this governmental structure
can hold negative repercussions if the pluralities are then forced to compete for power
and resources. In the case of Iraq and Lebanon, the establishment of an institution divided
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across religious lines has contributed to the politicization of one’s religious identity. In
particular, the association of religious identity in politics has evidently induced religious
inequality and exacerbated conflict. As scholar Kenneth Vaughan puts it,
Consociationalism unnecessarily essentializes ethnic and religious identities to
political disputes, which leads to intergroup inequality and conflict. Political
decisions and group gains and losses then become inextricably tied, which
increases the degree to which religious identification is politically consequential.
As group identities become intrinsic to political decision making, socioeconomic
and other prudential interests are rivaled by group identity.350
While consociationalists believe that this form of government is the most
effective way of adequately distributing resources among various ethnic groups, several
scholars are highly critical of the incapability of such structures to do so fairly and
equally. Critics argue that is almost impossible to achieve equal accommodations,
especially if the individuals chosen to represent a particular religious group don't
advocate for their group’s best interest, but for their own political agenda.351 In many
situations, the religious or ethnic group receiving misappropriately large amounts of
representation and influence in government appears to be the group that views the
government with the most legitimacy. Oppositely, ethno-communities that are not
receiving adequate representation are likely to feel marginalized, distrust the institutions
present, and view their government as illegitimate. As previously discussed, post-2003,
the Shia in Iraq are most likely to view their government as legitimate, while the
marginalized Sunni discredit it.
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Kenneth Vaughan completed a 2017 study in which he investigated whether
Lebanon’s prominent demographic groups think that they are equal beneficiaries of their
government’s public services and expenditures.352 Vaughan’s results suggest that not
only is Lebanon’s power-sharing government incapable of providing equal benefits for
the religious confessions as it is supposed to, but also that Lebanese Shia Muslims
regularly view the government as more legitimate on democracy-related matters than the
Sunnis, Maronites, and Druze.353 The Druze and Maronite Christians participants viewed
the Lebanese government most negatively regarding constitutional issues. Low trust in
government is emblematic of distinguished discrimination.
What if Sectarian Violence is Inevitable in Pluralistic States?
Several scholarly advocates of consociational democracies claim that all ethnic
antagonisms will lead to sectarian violence unless a power-sharing arrangement is
implemented. In the case of Iraq, the Shia Muslims had been violently oppressed for
nearly 23 years under Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. Any attempts of Iraqi Shia
rebellion was quickly, and severely, retaliated against by Hussein, which inevitably
increased the feelings of repression and anger from these marginalized communities.
Given this protracted history of oppression and deprivation, it is appealing to perceive
Iraq’s outbreak of sectarian brutality and warfare as conceivably inescapable due to the
prehistoric ethnic antagonisms and antiquated identities, such as that of the Sunni-Shia
Muslim divide. Several scholars actually contend that “this is the most persuasive
explanation of ethnic conflict. [International Relations Scholar Robert Kaplan] argues
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that through centuries of conflict, ethnic hatreds had become so fossilized that the region
would be inevitably plagued by warfare between these groups.”354 It is possible that these
scholars would view the situation in Iraq pre-2003 as a ticking time bomb, with the only
thing keeping these ethnic antagonisms from evolving into a civil war being Saddam’s
repressive dictatorship.
However, the belief that racial loathing inevitably leads to sectarian violence and
warfare is truly flawed. As academic Ches Thurber explains, even though the Sunni-Shia
conflict had been present for decades and was aggravated by Saddam’s cruel reign, “the
nature, timing, and degree of violence that occurred between 2003 and 2007 still remains
puzzling. The narrative of continual conflict overlooks the high levels of coexistence and
tolerance that existed among Baghdad’s middle-class communities. Intersectarian
tolerance persevered after the fall of Saddam, and it was not until 2005 that violence took
on a deadly sectarian pattern.”355 In other words, while Saddam was a ruthless ruler that
placed Sunni on a pedestal and violently targeted Shia and Kurds, Iraqi citizens were still
capable of coexistence under his rule. This is evident through the accounts of
intermarriage and pluralistic living conditions prior to 2003. If it is true that ethnic
antagonisms don’t always evolve into violent encounters, there must be a third variable
contributing to the outbreak.
In the case of Iraq, the violence that erupted was primarily triggered by the U.S.
interference and their establishment of a Shia-dominated consociational democracy and
de-baathification policies that forced the ethnic communities to compete over power,
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resources, and territory. Following the toppling of Saddam’s government, sectarian
violence became indiscriminate - anyone, including innocent civilians, could be killed at
any moment solely based on their religious identity. This illegitimate government
institution re-instigated identity politics and propagated a hostile environment for
intergroup ethnic communities, which as a result, created a platform for sectarian-based
brutality. As Thurber puts it: “rather than an unpreventable cause of war, identity-based
violence is a product of war that is shaped and driven by the surrounding conflict.”356 For
this reason, preexisting ethnic antagonisms are inadequate in explaining, and should not
be applied as the cause, for why these masked tensions erupted into such barbaric
violence. The religious tensions and hatreds had been present for years, and thus, it is
evident that there are certain actors or groups that play a key role in driving these
tensions to the brink of war. It is plausible that if Iraq’s history had taken a different path,
the outbreak of brutal sectarian violence could have been masked or avoided.
The understanding that not all ethnic antagonisms lead to sectarian violence has
critical implications on the viability of a power-sharing arrangement in Middle Eastern
multiethnic states. In the case of Lebanon, this suggests that a lack of violent outbreaks
between sectarian groups are not representative of the functionality of a power-sharing
arrangement. In other words, while it seems that Lebanon is faring better than its
neighbors because it has avoided an ‘Arab Spring’ situation of brutality like the one in
Iraq, it is an oversimplification to believe that their governance structure is working
effectively. Sectarian violence, or lack thereof, should not be utilized as an indicator of
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consociational structure success, as certain actors or events often tend to trigger ethnic
violence. In the case of Iraq, the outbreak of violence was largely due to external factors,
such as the U.S. intervention, rather than entrenched ethnic antagonisms. While Lebanon
has also experienced vast waves of foreign intervention, it was never as sudden and
forceful as the U.S. in Iraq. Similarly, Lebanon has functioned under a consociational
democracy for decades, while Iraq was undergoing a transition from a dictatorship to a
democracy for the first time ever. Thus, even though Lebanon appears to be experiencing
less sectarian violence than Iraq, the power-sharing arrangement has proved to be
detrimental to the functioning of the Lebanese state. There is an urgent need for Lebanon
to adopt an alternative government structure that is better tailored to its people and their
needs, or wait until the increasing sectarian tensions ensnare the country in another civil
war.
Recommendations for Iraq and Lebanon
In the consensus system, you cannot win everything and you cannot lose
anything. This becomes difficult because compromise in Arab culture is not
acceptable - it’s seen as a shame or weakness. If you look at Arab countries there
are two phases: dictatorship or a zero-sum struggle between the tribes, which
we’ve seen in Lebanon. The problem is that consensus democracy is an
oxymoron: consensus is the rule of all; democracy is the rule of the majority. So
you get paralysis, which has governed Lebanon, until one of the tribes grows
strong enough to dominate the others.357
- Fuad Hussein, Chief of Staff to President Massoud Barzani of Iraqi Kurdistan
Iraq
Sectarianism is firmly rooted in the principles and policies of the political
procedure in Iraq. The Shia overwhelmingly control the governance of the nation-state,
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creating a consummate climate for the radical mobilization of Sunni extremist groups,
and a desire for decentralization by the Kurds. The power-sharing arrangement has also
allowed Iraq “to become a playground for different regional and international powers
who are competing for influence and the country’s oil resources”358 As each party and
ethnic group is prioritizing their efforts on assembling their communities, little effort is
targeted towards bridging the sectarian gap. Many significant political players today are
advocating for a ‘managed breakup of Iraq under international auspices, facilitated
through a pre-agreed revenue allocation formula for distributing oil revenues among
autonomous regions that will have their own governments, police, army, civil service,
and systems of justice.”359 The breakup of Iraq is intended to warranty security and
defense of marginalized groups and contested land.
Through the politicization of religious identity due to sectarian-based powersharing institutions, the nationalistic narrative is indubitably tainted. As individuals turn
to their religious confessions for group identification, it is easy to forget that first and
foremost, one’s loyalty should be to the state itself. The sectarian nature that exists in Iraq
has been so encompassing that it has led opposing religious confessions to believe that
co-existence is inherently impossible, even though it is evident that the under Saddam’s
rule, religious differences were to some degree tolerated and normalized, especially in
multiethnic cities such as Baghdad.
In order to prevent Iraq from crumbling into several independent microstates, the
Iraqi government needs to focus on nation-building and “finding communal
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representatives [that don’t advance] communal divides.”360 Reconciliation plans are
necessary to re-institute government legitimacy, beginning with policies attending to the
alienation of the Sunni community. Power should no longer be divided across
ethnosectarian lines, but rather decentralized to eliminate exclusionary politics. An
increase in Sunni participation is essential to solving the issue of marginalization in Iraq
and eliminating insurgents such as ISIS. ISIS, a chief source of insecurity in Iraq, must
be eradicated, which can only be done by proving to the Sunnis that their government
will do a better job of representing their interests than an insurgency - easier said than
done. The progressive accumulation of Shiite power must come to an end, or else Sunni
disenfranchisement will continue to empower the insurgencies.
Lebanon
In a fractured society like Lebanon, the consociational government structure has
been a recipe for continual volatility rather than a framework intended to achieve ethnic
rapprochement. To reference Fuad Hussein’s quote from above, Lebanon’s powersharing political institution prioritizes demography over democracy, inescapably risking
identity-based exclusion and the marginalization of minorities. Political sectarianism has
emerged as a result, “creating perverse self-serving incentives for state officials and poor
governance outcomes.”361 These trends are continuously fortifying: heightening mistrust
and antipathies between religious communities, eroding prospects for improvement.
While Lebanon has remained stable-ly unstable, increased foreign domination and a
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gridlocked government might cause the country to fall apart - a disastrous situation in the
context of the Middle East today.
In order for Lebanon to escape the vicious cycle of crises, it must face the
challenge of drastically modifying its sectarian-based political institution to one that is
secular and tolerant. This refined governmental structure must be one in which the
national government is divided along political issues rather than religious lines, where
cross-sectarian political action is encouraged. In Lebanon today, to join the government
as a Sunni Muslim, one would have to adhere to the Sunni Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s
views and join his political organization, even if they don’t personally agree with his
politics. This logic is outdated and faulty. The future of Lebanon should consist of a
climate in which young leaders can join together to create platforms based on their
similar views on economic, social, and political views, instead of basing one’s alliance on
their religious affiliation.
While the transition into a stable centralized secular government is difficult, it is
unquestionably possible. The youth in Lebanon are frustrated with the politics of their
parents’ pasts and have begun to speak out about the corruption and sectarianism
encompassing their streets. This is largely evident through the formation of crosssectional political platforms such as Beirut Madinati. The next, and final chapter will
address the recommendations for Lebanon’s future, and analyze the ways in which we are
currently witnessing a movement towards secular politics.
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5
Conclusion
Over the course of this Thesis, I have attempted to investigate the role of illegitimate
political institutions in creating sectarian identities through the politicization of a
religious identity, the ethnic antagonisms that arise as a result of this power-sharing
arrangement, and the impact of political sectarianism on Lebanon’s development.
Sectarianism has been a critical factor behind Lebanon’s destructive wars,
underdevelopment, foreign intervention, and incessant political and social instability. It is
through Lebanon’s sect-based power-sharing governmental structure that an unhealthy
relationship between religion and politics is formed, prioritizing the needs of certain
confessions over those of individual citizens.362 In summary, this thesis offers the
following main arguments:
1. Consociational democracies or power-sharing arrangements accentuate segmental
cleavages, such as religion/identity-based divisions, due to the dissection of power
and influence along ethnic lines. As a result, this heightens intergroup
antagonisms and violence.
2. Sectarian identities are associated with the relative power of certain ethnic groups.
Thus, these identities are not salient, but rather subject to change as long as they
are accompanied by shifting power dynamics and political reforms. Since the
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sectarian discourse in Lebanon has shifted from a Christian-Muslim divide to a
Sunni-Shia divide, is it possible for these identities to shift again.
3. In the case of Lebanon, identity-based divisions can be alleviated with a shift
towards a secular government that erases the focus on one’s sect identity and
prioritizes the Lebanese national identity. The emergence of cross-sectional
platforms and reforms to the current sectarian-political system are crucial in
eliminating sectarianism.
This thesis first explores how divisions along religious lines in Lebanon’s political
institutions allow for the politicization of one’s religious identity, and the manifestation
of religion into one’s most defining feature. The structure of the Lebanese consociational
democracy, intended to represent all of Lebanon’s 18 religious communities, instead
creates a scenario in which these ethnic groups are pitted against each other in
government. Since religion in Lebanon is directly associated with the amount of power,
resources, and territory a religious group receives in government, this creates for ethnic
antagonisms between marginalized religious communities and those with larger influence
- also known as sectarianism.
However, through delving into the history of Lebanon and its consequent powershifts between prominent ethnic groups, it is evident that sectarian identities are subject
to change depending on the amount of influence held by a group at a particular time. For
instance, prior to the Lebanese Civil War, the Maronite Christians maintained the most
abundant share of power, causing the Sunni and Shia Muslims to feel as though they
lacked adequate representation. The conflict was initially rooted in antagonisms between
Muslims versus Christians. Oppositely, the end of the civil war led to some modifications
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in the Lebanese power-sharing arrangement that gave Christians and Muslims equal
representation. Now that the Sunni and Shia Muslims held more representation in
government, this caused a shift in the sectarian conflict from Christians v. Muslims, to
Sunni v. Shia. This historical transition is representative of the ever-constant shifting
sands of sectarianism, and that ethnic antagonisms are often associated with power and
resources and less rooted in imminent religious hostilities. It is important to recognize
that the seemingly ‘religious’ conflict in Lebanon and the Middle East more broadly is
not religious at all, but rather deeply politicized and determined by intergroup power
dynamics.
There is reason to believe that since the sectarian lines have been previously altered in
Lebanon’s past, it is possible that they can be altered again. Sectarianism in Lebanon is
chiefly based on the infiltration of religious politics in government; hence, in order to
eliminate this entrenched system, there needs to be a move towards a secular state. By
removing the association of religion with power and resources, the elimination of
political sectarianism is achievable. The current illegitimate power-sharing institution
diminishes the significance the Lebanese national identity and allows for the
prioritization of one’s sect/religious identity. The shift towards a secular government
would reduce the current perpetual cycle of competition between Lebanon’s prominent
confessions, and place emphasis on the national identity, reducing ethnic antagonisms.
Underdevelopment in Lebanon is largely a result of sectarian politics that allow for a
clientelist system that encourages an ever-spinning web of corruption, lack of
accountability of the political elite, and inept basic services for all Lebanese citizens despite the noteworthy amount of foreign aid. Further, Lebanon’s economy is devastated
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and consumed by crippling debt that it is incapable of paying off. Yet, due to the
sectarianism in government, the dominant political elite have managed to uphold their
authority even though they continuously find ways to profit from misspent public funds,
and manage to place the blame of failing to provide public services on the state itself.
This volatile situation, as described by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
is a vicious cycle in which: a “lack of cross-sectarian competition insulates elites from
accountability, fostering patronage and clientelism, which leads to corruption and
misspent public funds, which leads to state weakness and a failure to provide services for
all, which leads to increased citizen dependence on the clientelist system, which leads to
a lack of elite accountability.”363
Moreover, the case of Iraq provides evidence that ethnic antagonisms between groups
are not inevitable; rather, they can be triggered by events or illegitimate organizations
that prioritize certain groups while marginalizing others. Power-sharing institutions or
consociational democracies, as implemented in Iraq and Lebanon, may not be the most
practical solution for multiethnic states attempting to achieve reconciliation. As explained
by Donald Horowitz, Professor of Law and Political Science at Duke, societies that are
ethnically segmented are more likely to face adverse repercussions from power-sharing
arrangements, since they “encourage ethnic or religious-based voting, thereby reinforcing
polarization and communal tensions rather than moving towards peace and democratic
reform.”364 Additionally, as highlighted by Rima Majid, consociationalism should not be
a policy prescription or solution for multiethnic states, because it can often do more harm
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than good. Instead of serving as a solution, the institutionalization of identity-based
divisions often become a self-fulfilling prophecy, increasing the intergroup tensions and
making it more challenging to overcome political reforms.365 Thus, in order to develop an
appropriate alternative, post-conflict solutions must adequately analyze the root causes of
the crisis instead of rushing to resolve the conflict in ways that yield larger complications,
inevitably worsening the situation.
In the case of Lebanon, the most effective way to overcome the deeply entrenched
system of sectarianism is to eliminate it in its entirety through the separation of religion
and government. While this is substantially easier said than done, I hypothesize that it is a
plausible solution for several reasons. First, it is evident that political identities are not
salient, and highly associated with regional, geopolitical, structural, and power changes.
Thus, through modifying the political structure and power dynamics, social identities are
subject to change, and intergroup rivalries - especially that of the Sunni-Shia divide - can
be reduced over time. Second, while it is difficult to envision a political horizon in
Lebanon that doesn’t entail sectarianism, there has been a recent emergence of crosssectional platforms that give hope to the notion of a secular government. While the
transition away from a sectarian political system may take months, or even years, if there
is a youth movement of civic activism large enough, they are capable of creating
equalized power relations between ethnic groups and restoring faith in the Lebanese
government for all. There’s reason to believe that this movement currently exists, and is
taking Lebanon by storm.
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It Is Time to Challenge the Status Quo: An Alternative Lebanon
The problem today, because of the religious leaders sharing power in government, is that
they are also sharing the income and benefitting off the government. No Shia can go into
government if he is not pro-Hezbollah, no Druze can go in if he’s not pro-Jumblatt.
Without a major change in the mindsets of people, nothing will change. There should be
a civilian new generation party that is secular, and that has a spectrum of all different
religions but same mindset and goals for country. There should also be separation
between religion and government in Lebanon. I know it’s not an easy transition, and a
historically established part of Lebanese life and identity, but it’s possible. We just need
the community to take initiative.” - Dana, AUB Student
In order for Lebanon to overcome its deeply entrenched system of political
sectarianism, the people must aim for progressive reforms that will ultimately create a
secular society. The notion of secularism in the Lebanese context is extremely
contradictory to the subsisting sectarian order. This multifaceted consociational system
consists of “both the distribution of government and administrative posts among the
various confessions and the relinquishing of personal status jurisdictions to the religious
courts,” making one’s religious sect an inescapable reality of everyday life.366 For this
reason, investigating anti-sectarian movements in Lebanon after the civil war was
considered impractical. Everyone believed that any efforts to challenge the status quo
were doomed to fail in a system of political deadlock and regional instability,
discouraging individuals from local level mobilization. Then came July 2015. Despite the
mounting challenges, the first prominent al-Hirak (anti-sectarian movement) became a
reality. It’s time to stop talking about our sectarian differences, and start talking about our
fundamental rights.
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Tul’it Rihitkum - Lebanon, YOU STINK!
The ‘You Stink’ movement, briefly mentioned in the third chapter on
underdevelopment, erupted in July 2015 out of resentment and anger against an
illegitimate government witnessing a presidential vacuum, corrupt political elite, a lack of
basic services, and a river of trash that absorbed the streets of Beirut - to say the very
least. The citizens had long overlooked the corruption and inaction in the Lebanese
government, but the ongoing trash problem sparked a strong sentiment of discontent and
extensive frustration, inviting the “largest public action” Lebanon has seen since 2005.
With over 150,000 protesters taking to the streets for over 12 weeks, this citizen-led
movement was unprecedented in Lebanon not only for its size and duration, but most
significantly, for its cross-sectional and anti-sectarian nature.
In regards to the trash crisis and the absence of a permanent landfill, the protesters
called for the development of an environmentally friendly, sustainable solution for
disposing of the waste, and a functional recycling system. With a growing sense of
frustration, these demands broadened to include the resignation of the Ministry of
Environment, overdue parliamentary elections, accountability of corrupt political elite,
and the elimination of sectarianism, among other things.367 As the movement gained
momentum, numerous “existing civil society organizations, student movements, leftist
groups, and newly formed collectives” bound together to increase the impact.368
Concurrently, citizens of all genders, ages, religions, and socio-economic backgrounds,
joined these collectives on the streets, abandoning the mention of political parties. The
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Lebanese diaspora also communicated their support and unanimity through assembling
peaceful protests in a myriad of cities all over the world.369
While these demonstrations initially pressured state institutions to engage in
paramount reforms, in an environment where identity politics and sectarianism persists,
the political elite were incapable of agreeing on a solution for the trash crisis - and got
away with it. It became quickly evident that power-sharing arrangements play a role in
limiting mobilization dynamics.
Yet, despite failing to achieve political reforms, the civic mobilization efforts can be
considered a success as they provoked a sense of empowerment and political activism
among the Lebanese population, in a particularly trying time of paralysis. Further, the
#You Stink movement was novel in demonstrating that it is possible to challenge the
status quo. To do, however, civic activists must “establish cross-sectarian relations across
the country, or create new political formations that can compete in elections at all
levels.”370 This suggests that in order to overthrow the stifling sectarian order, civic
groups must unite mixed ethnic populations on issue-based activism, rather than religion
or political party based divides. This form of civic activism is taking place in Lebanon at
this very moment.
Understanding al-Hirak
Prior to the new anti-sectarian wave, civic activism along sectarian lines has long
been a vital attribute of the Lebanese population tracing back to the 1990s. Following the
civil war, Lebanon’s well-established network of civil society organizations, labor
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unions, and political parties strongly advocated for government reforms and
parliamentary elections to occur. One of the significant contributions of these groups was
the creation of the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE) in 1996 to
oversee the elections and ensure their legitimacy.371 To this day, LADE observes all
levels of governmental elections. The “Baladi, Baldati, Baladiyati” (My Country, My
Town, My Municipality) movement of 1998 was also distinguished for fighting against
the postponed municipal elections, making it clear to the political elite that this is
unacceptable, preventing them from delaying the elections again.372
The recent influx of anti-sectarian movements in the post-war era has been
dominated by the plurality of individuals, collectives, NGOs, and student groups, among
others, fighting a collective battle to abolish the sect-based confessional system of
governance. Many activists that have joined anti-partisan collectives have vocalized
frustration with the system placing emphasis on one’s religion. They claim that religion
should not be representative of one’s political affiliation, or even one’s beliefs, thus
rejecting the role of religion in their country’s government. Anti-sectarian civic activism
first emerged in 2006 with the “first conference of the seculars in Lebanon, which
brought together the various collectives promoting secularism at the time.”373 Yet the
movement did not gain much recognition until the Arab uprisings of 2011, which aroused
an atmosphere of upheaval in Lebanon that led to demonstrations aimed to demolish the
sectarian regime. After which several youth collectives surfaced to advocate for issues of

371

Ibid.
Ibid.
373
Alexandra Kassir, “‘We are here’: a new wave of anti-sectarian mobilizations in Lebanon.”
372

116

individual freedoms, LGBT rights, domestic violence, women’s rights, and government
services.374
These youth coalitions chiefly operate on social media platforms, such as
Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and crowdfunding, to share their message and mobilize the
masses.375 According to Lebanese Professor Mona Harb, since 2011, these collectives
have become dominantly issue-based, and tend to include high percentages of young
women in executive positions.376 With time, the excitement from the 2011 protests died
down, and it wasn’t until the 2015 You Stink movement that organized protests and
coalitions began to emerge.
The Beirut Madinati (Beirut, My City) Experience
The You Stink protests were significant in encouraging the mobilization of young
individuals and civil society organizations against government corruption. Yet, due to
their separation from the formal political process in Lebanon, the movement was
inadequate in forcing the political institutions to undergo any changes. This led to the
emergence of Beirut Madinati, a cross-sectional, anti-sectarian platform consisting of
young urban activists that were inspired to compete in the 2016 Beirut municipal
elections as opposition to the existing sectarian-based political system. The group’s
candidates came from diversified milieus, including arts, media, business, engineering,
architecture, and urban planning.377 In a span of six-months, they created a campaign
based on critical urban issues, recruited candidates and over 1,500 volunteers, arranged
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neighborhood discussions and dialogues on prominent matters, and succeeded in
obtaining the necessary funds they needed to compete through crowdfunding campaigns
and social media outreach.378
The basis of this grassroots organization’s platform was to increase political
conscientiousness about the widespread misconduct and defective forms of decisionmaking present in state institutions.379 Beirut Madinati wrote and compiled a thirty-twopage program that tackled the capital’s shortcomings and limitations, and advanced their
solutions on enhancing public services such as transportation, public spaces, costly
housing, conserving cultural heritage, eco-friendly initiatives, and more.380 The group
was able to allure a large following across generational, religious, regional, and class
divides through their anti-government rhetoric, offering the citizens of Beirut a practical
alternative to the political elite and their dysfunctional patronage system that has long
prioritized personal benefits over public good.381 For many Lebanese, Beirut Madinati
was indicative of a ‘return to the essentials of politics,’ especially after experiencing
decades lacking consequential political activity.382
Even though Beirut Madinati lost the municipal elections to the Beirut political
elite, they managed to secure 30% of the votes - a considerable amount for an antisectarian platform in a city governed by partisan politics.383 More significantly, by
operating a comprehensive issue-based platform, Beirut Madinati indirectly forced the
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Beirut political elite to address critical matters for the first time if they wished to secure
their previously unopposed win. This initiative galvanized civil society groups to form on
the basis of issues, rather than sectarian groups, revealing a loss of confidence in
Lebanon’s political parties. By addressing critical matters that the public viewed as
important and the sectarian system had failed to address, Beirut Madinati proved that it
was possible to challenge the political elites.
This was also the first time in Lebanon’s history that a cross-sectarian coalition
made it this far, further empowering the activists all over Lebanon to continue their
attempts at dismantling the multifaceted power-sharing arrangement. This ripple effect is
evident through the prominence of “independent municipal campaigns that were running
in other regions and towns in Lebanon taking up similar names, such as Jounieh
Madinati, Nabatieh Madinati, Tripoli Madinati, Deir el-Kamar Baldati, etc.”384 Beirut
Madinati was successful in revealing a basic underlying truth: “as long as the elites
control institutions and public resources, the Lebanese electoral system will continue to
create very limited opportunities for non-elite cross-sectarian movements to effectively
challenge the status quo.”385 The momentous takeaway from the Beirut Madinati
experience was that one way to make a tangible change in a rigid political system is to
partake in the political process, particularly elections, rather than whining aimlessly while
waiting for conditions to magically improve. Finally, The Beirut Madinati experience set
a precedent for other civil society groups, and is a key factor behind these newly formed
nationalistic, anti-government platforms’ decision to compete in the upcoming
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parliamentary elections taking place in May 2018. The elite’s place in the political system
is not definite, and citizens are irrevocably ready to see how fast they can fall.

The Upcoming Elections May 2018
They’re like the guy who pisses in the ocean and thinks it will rise. I don’t view these
[nonsectarian, nonpartisan groups] as a threat in the elections.
- Bassem Shabb, current Member of Parliament within Hariri’s Sunni Future Bloc
We can start to make progress by changing the way that we vote. We should be allowed
to vote for individuals outside our religious sect based on the ideas and issues they
address. Just because someone is Shia or Sunni or Orthodox doesn’t mean that I don’t
agree with their political viewpoints. It’s not fair, limiting us to only voting for our sect
and representatives from our area. The entire youth population needs to opt for secular
leaders, and stop re-electing the political elite. – Kaiya, LAU Student
Lebanon is currently gearing up for its first election season in nearly a decade,
with the last parliamentary election held on June 7th, 2009. These elections have been
consistently delayed due to political gridlock over electoral law reforms, security issues,
and a two-year political vacuum that inappropriately permitted the parliament to ‘extend
its own mandate twice.’386 With a new electoral law in place, elections are ready to be
held on May 6, 2018. Yet, unlike previous elections, this year several cross-sectional
anti-sectarian groups are competing in the political battle, pitting the country’s old
corrupt elite against a new, unorthodoxly radical current. With 128 parliamentary seats,
976 candidates are competing, 111 of which are female candidates, up from the 12
women who engaged in the previous 2009 elections and the 4 women who are a part of
the parliament now.387
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Further, on January 19 a group of independent activists came together to
announce their creation of Tahaluf Watani - Lebanon’s National Coalition -, which
contains over ten anti-sectarian groups, including “Li Baladi, Baalbek Madinati, and You
Stink, to compete for seats across the country’s 15 districts.”388 Sabaa, Arabic for Seven,
is another nonsectarian/nonpartisan group that has emerged to compete in the upcoming
elections. Similar to other alternative groups, Sabaa calls for radical change,
accountability, and a functioning society with basic services, which they claim they can
provide. According to their campaign, “Seven sees Lebanon as the ultimate homeland for
all its people and a model of multiculturalism within a civil state that preserves all
freedoms, respects all human beings, and separates religion from the state.”389 Uniquely,
Sabaa believes in the sovereignty of the Lebanese state and wants to ensure that national
parties don’t receive foreign funding, from Iran or Saudi Arabia for example, as that
would hinder the government’s functionality.
It is important, however, to consider the overbearing difficulties this civic
activism movement faces in surpassing an identity-based power-sharing system and
accomplishing durable reforms. Some of these challenges include: a hegemonic sectarian
political system that has been in place since the country’s independence, a tense
geopolitical war in which Lebanon is caught in the middle, a neighboring refugee crisis,
and powerful parliamentary elite and government policies that have ‘threatened youth
activism before through co-optation, manipulation, neutralization, and repression.’390 It’s
difficult to conceive that the country’s youth is capable of overcoming these challenges
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and eliminating the sectarian government - but there’s reason to believe that it’s possible.
After Beirut Madinati’s ability to receive a significant percentage of the votes in the last
municipality elections there was a shift in public mood. Many individuals and groups felt
empowered to continue fighting for political change because they could finally see the
possibilities of their efforts. There is still an arduous road to face dominated by many
obstacles, but it is a path many are willing to take.
Due to the extensive delay in elections, this round of elections will bear a new
generation of voters that were previously unable to vote. With worsening socioeconomic
living conditions and a corrupt system of patronage, these promising alternative and
radical groups might actually stand a chance at reforming Lebanon’s rigid sectarian
political scene. While this thesis concludes prior to the election date, I am hoping that this
cycle brings positive change to Lebanon. Yet, even if the nonpartisan groups fail to grab
a significant amount of parliamentary seats, I am confident that Lebanon is experiencing
a wave of positive change that starts with the youth. It doesn’t happen in days, or even
months, but with time, even a pluralistic Lebanon can find a way to overcome its
sectarian antagonisms.

We are in the midst of a movement.
Long Live Lebanon.
Lubnan Balade.
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